

FOREIGN POLICY OF PAKISTAN

**A Compendium of Speeches made in the National
Assembly of Pakistan
1962-64**



**By
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto**

Reproduced in pdf form by
Sani Panhwar

Introduction

The speeches contained in this volume necessarily relate largely to what is the most important aspect of Pakistan's foreign policy, namely, this country's relations with India. Last year, when the President of India, Dr. Radhakrishnan, visited the United States, he was reported to have said that India was prepared to offer a "No War Pact" to Pakistan and to have it registered with the United Nations. A similar proposal was made by the late Jawaharlal Nehru in 1950 to our Prime Minister, the late Liaquat Ali Khan. This offer was repeated recently on the eve of the breakdown of last year's Kashmir negotiations.

Much has been made of this "No War Pact" offer. The President of India proposed that it be registered with the United Nations, implying that such registration would give the Pact international validity in law and in morality which it would not otherwise possess. The contempt shown by the Government of India for the United Nations' resolutions on Jammu and Kashmir make us feel very sceptical about Indian assurances. Pakistan is a member of the United Nations and, as all members of the world organisation, is enjoined by its Charter to resolve international disputes by peaceful means. Article II, paragraphs III and IV of the United Nations Charter are relevant in this respect. Paragraph III of that article states: "All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." Paragraph IV of the same article states; "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." Article 33 of the Charter states: "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first

of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."

These two articles place an obligation on Pakistan, and indeed on all other members of the United Nations, to settle their disputes by peaceful means. As a member of the United Nations for the last fifteen years, we have loyally carried out, in letter and in spirit, the resolutions and directions of the United Nations. That being so, we find it superfluous to agree to a "No War Pact" with the Government of India. The Government of India too, as a member of the United Nations, is enjoined by its Charter to settle all disputes by peaceful procedures. The proposed Pact is, therefore, unnecessary also from the point of view of India, that is, if India is sincere in its intentions. -;

When we entered into negotiations with the Government of India earlier last year for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute, our position was, as it always has been, that the people of Kashmir should exercise their right of self-determination and thus make their own decision as to their future affiliation. The Government of India, on the other hand, although earlier on it professed belief in it, did not regard that self-determination was the appropriate way of settling the problem. Indeed, they proposed what they called "a political settlement". On the eve of the sixth round of the talks, it was found that the chances for the success of the negotiations were remote. At that juncture, India came forward with its offer of a "No War Pact", which really meant that, notwithstanding the absence of a settlement, India wanted a disengagement of forces. If we were to agree to it, it would mean our accepting the status quo, which certainly could not be described as an honourable or equitable solution of the Kashmir problem. There are also other dangers in our agreeing to a solution on the basis of the status quo. These I shall now proceed to illustrate.

The Indus Basin Treaty clearly stipulates that the Treaty is not to come in the way of a settlement of the Kashmir problem. That being so, we were amazed when the Government of India argued that the Treaty barred Pakistan's claims on the River Chenab. If today we agree to a "No War Pact", tomorrow we shall most likely be told that the Government of Pakistan had agreed to a "No War Pact" and, therefore, the Government of Pakistan was committed to the cease-fire line as the permanent boundary between India and Pakistan and that the Kashmir problem had, therefore, been settled. Otherwise, they will say, Pakistan would not have agreed to the "No War Pact".

Not that Pakistan will resort to an armed attack on India. No country, however, can forsake its inherent sovereign right to seek a settlement of its international disputes. While Pakistan will never resort to force, at the same time, we cannot sign on the dotted line as prescribed by India and deny ourselves our right to resolve our disputes with India. Like the Indus Basin Treaty, a "No War Pact" would be used by India as an instrument to freeze the Kashmir question on the basis of the present cease-fire line, which India has repeatedly urged.

Pakistan is one-fourth of the size of India in respect of population, territory, armed forces and economic strength. We could never think of embarking on aggression against India, not only because we are a smaller country, but also because it is a cardinal principle of our foreign policy to settle all disputes by peaceful means and through negotiations in accordance with the purposes of the United Nations Charter. Our record shows that we have never departed from this principle.

It would be repugnant to our interests, to bur higher principles, to the welfare of our people and to the peace and stability of the sub-continent and of Asia, to embark on aggression against India to achieve a solution of the Kashmir problem or for any other reason. We have never taken aggressive action. We were not even tempted to resort to a show of force during India's hour of humiliation and defeat in the autumn of 1962. That is sufficient

evidence of Pakistan's peaceful intentions. I think very few countries would have restrained themselves, as Pakistan did, when India lay completely beaten by the armies of the People's Republic of China.

On the other hand, what has been the conduct of India ? India has the rare privilege of being the only modern State which, in fifteen years, has resorted to armed force no less than five times.

In this context let us consider the statements of the leaders of India, and I do not mean those outside the Government. I refer to the statements of responsible leaders of the Government of India, the late Prime Minister, his cabinet colleagues and the President of the Indian Congress Party. The late Prime Minister Nehru said: "So far as China and Pakistan are concerned, India is determined to vacate their aggression." He said this on the 21st January, 1962. Mr. Nehru pointed out that "Gandhiji had himself definitely and clearly approved of Indian action in Kashmir. It was not non-violent action. Gandhiji went a step further when at the beginning of World War II he commended the Polish Government for resisting Hitler violently and by war." Mr. Nehru added: "There were certain things which were worse than the maintenance of peace, by trying to maintain it by cowardice. Cowardice is no peace. Gandhiji had said that if one could not fight non-violently with courage, one should take to the sword and fight." (Statesman, 29th December, 1961.)

The former Defence Minister of India, Mr. Krishna Menon, stated: "You are aware we have not abjured violence in regard to any country who violates our interests." (Hindustan Times, 6th December 1961.) Mr. Menon assured the workers of the Congress Party that "just as the Goa problem has been solved the China and Pakistan problems would also be solved." (Statesman, 26th December 1961.) The Congress President, Mr. Sanjiva Reddy, said: "We have to liberate the occupied areas in Kashmir. We are postponing the issue that we do not accept the cease-fire line as a permanent solution." He

expected the people in "occupied areas" Of Kashmir to struggle to rid them selves of the usurper and "within a short period of time the Government will choose the correct time to liberate that part of Kashmir also as it had done in respect of Goa." (Statesman. 5th January, 1962.)

These are statements of Indian leaders who offer Pakistan a "No War Pact"!

Barring India, Pakistan has good relations with all countries of our region and the world at large. We have tried to resolve our differences by peaceful means with all our neighbours, with all countries with whom we had differences. Some of the agreements concluded by us may not have recorded complete success for us, but even partial success shows that Pakistan seeks peaceful settlements and peaceful adjustments of its problems with all countries. We have resolved our differences with the Government of Afghanistan. We have settled our boundary problems with Iran and Burma. We have very cordial relations with Nepal, with Ceylon and with the great country of Indonesia. We have good relations with countries like Malaya, Thailand and Philippines. We have recently concluded a boundary agreement which draws a line of peace between Pakistan and the People's Republic of China. How is it that Pakistan, motivated by goodwill and a desire for co-operation with all peoples of Asia and of Africa, can settle its problems with all of them except India? The reason is that India is an aggressor state and that India does not believe in peaceful settlement of its disputes with the countries that surround it.

What guarantee does a "No War Pact" really offer? Actually it creates a false sense of security. History shows that the initiative for proposals for "No War Pacts" has generally emanated from prospectively aggressor states—states with an aggressive intent, such as Nazi Germany. The Ribbontrop-Molotov Pact is a classic example of a "No War Pact." If India were to embark on aggression against Pakistan and we were to defend ourselves, which is a right permitted under the United Nations Charter, India would turn round and tell the world, in its characteristic histrionic fashion, that it was Pakistan that

had committed aggression, for "peace-loving" India had offered a "No War Pact" to Pakistan and, having done that, how could India commit aggression?

Thus, apart from creating an illusion which might lull us into a false sense of security, such a Pact would arm India with a subtle instrument with which to justify its aggression against Pakistan. For these important considerations, Pakistan cannot accept India's offer of a "No War Pact". India is an aggressor state and we cannot have a "No War Pact" with an aggressor state. India must first settle the Kashmir problem on an honourable and an equitable basis. Once that is done according to the dictates of justice and equity, we shall be willing to have not one "No War Pact" with India but as many as India might desire. But to that condition India would not agree. The purpose of India in making the present offer of a "No War Pact" is a deceptive one. It is to advance India's own interests. Pakistan cannot be an accessory to further self-aggrandisement by India.

The people of Asia must have a better life; they must have better means of livelihood. We know the meaning of the torture and torment of disease and want. We know that it is not the law of God that Asians alone should be poor. We should like Asia to progress. We should like the under-developed world to develop. We cannot match the opulence of Europe and America but our hope is to see that our people lead a better life and free themselves and their children from poverty and destitution. Thus we should like to see a prosperous Asia. And included in it is a prosperous India, for the people of Pakistan have no ill-will towards the people of India.

However, the augmentation of the military strength of India is not calculated to help in eradicating its poverty. Nor can India, which claims the right to dominate the entire stretch from the Hindukush to the Mekong River, be a state which can be trusted with arms. In its frustration, it is bound to turn those arms against smaller and weaker states, and number one amongst them would be Pakistan, for the leaders of India have always declared that,

in spite of their conflict with China, Pakistan is India's Enemy Number One. Thus, these arms with which India is now being fed will be turned against Pakistan for the settlement of its "disputes" with us by means which have become traditional and characteristic with "free India". India, as has been pointed out, has in the last fifteen years "settled" five of its disputes by the use of force. These weapons might be turned also against other smaller countries of the neighbourhood and of South East Asia. With all its military augmentation, the geographical position being what it is, India cannot fight the colossus to its north. So in its despair, in its anger and its desire for aggrandisement, these weapons will be turned against the helpless people of South and South East Asia, and particularly against the people of Pakistan. This is our genuine fear. It is also a natural fear. With the experience we have had of India, we know the meaning of arming India. It is for this reason that we protest against it. This voice of protest is not the voice of the Government alone but that of the one hundred million people of Pakistan.

The President of India, a very peace-loving man in a peace-loving garb, said in the United States in 1963: "India will be able to settle the problem only by having strength with which to back her bargaining power." The consequences of this statement are self-apparent. This statement of the Head of the State of India, representing 450 million people, reveals in an unmistakable manner India's intentions. This statement makes it plain that additional arms would enable India to settle its disputes from a position of strength. The bargaining power to be used against whom? Not against China, as has just been explained. India wants to arm itself for the sole purpose of being able to dictate its terms to Pakistan, at least to make Pakistan accept a settlement in Kashmir such as India desires, that is, on the basis of the cease-fire line.

The late Prime Minister of India was known for his protestations of peace and goodwill for all. On the eve of the invasion of Goa, while on a visit to the United States, he told the American people: "Peace is a passion with us". But soon thereafter his war machine was turned against Goa. Pakistan should be

prepared for a similar manifestation of the Indian passion for peace. It is not that these arms will necessarily be used; their display or even their presence is equally menacing. India with its massive arms might well be able to fulfil its objectives without resorting to their use. For over fifteen years we have striven, we have made sacrifices, we have made our poor people take less than what, was their share, we have deprived them of their basic minimum necessities, in order to be able to maintain a precarious military balance with India. All these hardships have been cheerfully endured by our people for the sake of the security of their country. Peace can only be maintained when there is a balance of power and such a balance is needed in the sub-continent in the same way as it is needed for peace in the world/But with the new accretion to the military strength of India all our sacrifices are going to be in vain.

India tells the world that it tears aggression from China and for this reason India must mobilise its resources and its strength and get assistance from Western countries with whom, just before the conflict between India and China, India was barely on talking terms. India is now warning the world about the danger from Communist China. For twelve years, India had been telling the world that the two great countries of Asia, India and China, would never resort to force, because, India said, they belonged to Asia and the values of Asia were different from those of the West, because the doctrines of imperialism, of lebensraum and of exploitation were unknown to Asia and Western values could not apply to the East. There would be, India said, eternal friendship between China and India and they would forever live in peace. But all of a sudden, in October 1962, all these pious promises were discarded and the world is now being informed of "the menace of Communist China", "the great dangers that Communism and Communist China pose for Asia and for the rest of the world". Who knows, in not too distant future, India might again reverse its stand, for it remains uncommitted, a so-called "neutral" country. Whereas India is under no obligation whatsoever to adhere to any set policy, other countries that are bound by alliances have such an

obligation. There is no give and take as far as India is concerned. It retains its freedom of action, and still gets the best of both the worlds. India might well settle its problem with China. It is not an insoluble problem. It is a question of the adjustment of boundaries and India might, as through the Colombo Powers, still achieve a settlement with China. Once its problem with China is settled, the same philosophy of Panch Sheela might again prevail, and we might again be told that between the two great countries of Asia there can be no question of a conflict. All the strength and might of India will then be turned against Pakistan, for in India's eyes, Pakistan alone is a heresy.

If India is really concerned about the threat from People's China, and fears a military invasion by it, India should join SEATO and CENTO. Why does not India do that? If it really thinks it is going to be the prey of Communist aggression, it should join these anti-Communist defence arrangements. Let it come under the umbrella of collective self-defence against aggression. But India will never join SEATO or CENTO because it is not interested in self-defence. India is an aggressor state, and an aggressor state would not join an arrangement which is meant for defence against aggression and the preservation of peace. That India would not do so is in itself evidence that it is intent upon committing aggression. That will be against Pakistan. India dare not commit aggression against China.

Dr. Radhakrishnan, President of India, also declared in America: "India's policy of non-alignment did not mean it was not aligned or committed to freedom, to peace and to peaceful methods of bringing about justice." If India's policy of non-alignment means that it is aligned to the interests of freedom, the question arises which country in this century is not interested in freedom? Do you have to be an aligned country or a non-aligned country, a socialist country or a capitalist country, to be interested in freedom? Anyhow, India claims that it also is interested in peace. Yet in fifteen years it has embarked on aggression on no less than five occasions. What is its concept

of peace? It is by its deeds and deeds alone that a nation is judged, not by its words, not by its protestations, not by eloquent utterances such as "peace is a passion with us."

It has been said that by signing a boundary agreement with the People's Republic of China. Pakistan has committed a terrible sin. The People's Republic of China is a neighbour of Pakistan and has a long boundary with it. But we have committed a sin in the eyes of the Government of India by achieving a boundary agreement with our neighbour, and for this we shall never be forgiven. This logic fits in the web of Indian policies and only Indian leaders can understand it.

India has thought it fit to read into the boundary agreement a secret clause stipulating that (Pakistan and the People's Republic of China will act in collusion against India. This has been stated often enough. At first we felt that it was so absurd and so terribly Indian that it was not necessary to answer it. The answer is very simple. It is this: Test us, have peace with us, come to a settlement with us, have disengagement with us and try to live in harmony with us. This is the best way of finding out whether there is a secret agreement between us and China directed against India. The fact is we do not have any secret agreements. We do not believe in such things. To use the classic language of earlier times, we believe in open covenants openly arrived at. We have openly joined SEATO and CENTO and these treaties are public documents. We do not conduct our policies in secrecy. Perhaps the Government of India does and perhaps it has secret agreements. But our hands are clean; our conscience is clear. We have no secret agreement with any country in the world and that includes the People's Republic of China. We agree with the People's Republic of China in the matter of peaceful, honourable and equitable settlement of disputes. If you call that a secret agreement, we have such an agreement with every nation of the world

Now in order to justify the Indian position. Dr. Radhakrishnan said that "India's neutrality was in the interest of the United States of America". How very generous of India! The United States Government ought to be grateful to India. Dr. Radhakrishnan explains further: "We are able to talk to the Soviet Union not as a partisan but as a people interested in trying to safeguard the highest canons of justice and telling them that it is their duty to understand and come to a settlement." The Indians' neutrality puts them in a position to talk to the people of Soviet Union, and for this they want all the armed assistance they can get from the United States. For this same reason they qualify for armed assistance from the Soviet Union. They, therefore, want to maintain their so-called policy of neutrality. Why? Because they can talk as a people to the people of the Soviet Union. If India can talk to the 200 million people of the Soviet Union, we can talk to the 650 million people of the People's Republic of China on the same basis and our friends should approve of it and encourage us to do so. In pursuance of it they should even ask us to leave the Pacts. If something is virtuous for India, how is it that it is not virtuous for Pakistan? If it is a virtue for Pakistan to be a committed country, why is it not a virtue for India also to be a committed country? Why should there be double standards? Should there not be one international standard and one international code of conduct and morality for all countries?

In view of all that has been happening, the combinations that are taking shape and the way things are moving, is it not time to ask whether the Soviet Union is pursuing a realistic policy? The Soviet Union, a great country, must be congratulated for orbiting men, women and animals in outer space, but it must also keep its feet on the ground. We would like to ask if its partisan policy on Kashmir, which in some respects, is more Indian than India's own, is in the highest interest of world peace and security? If India in its present position is to become the recipient of military assistance both from the United States and from the Soviet Union, is there not some basic and innate contradiction in it? With the passage of time the contradiction is

becoming more and more apparent. No glib explanation and no political jugglery of words can ever reconcile the irreconcilable. The sleeping princess of the socialist world will have to realise the basic contradiction in the policy it is pursuing, and it must come to a clear and precise understanding of the principle involved in the Kashmir dispute. It must abandon its policy of partisanship in that dispute. Even India has abandoned its earlier stand on Kashmir. India told the world, and she told the Soviet Union, that Kashmir was a settled question; that under no circumstances would it be reopened; that it was a closed issue. Apart from what has been happening inside Kashmir during recent months, six rounds of negotiations on Kashmir have taken place between the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan. That is enough to show that Kashmir is far from a closed issue. These new developments must be a source of embarrassment to the Soviet Union, the great Power that assisted India on the assumption that Kashmir was a closed issue. Kashmir can never be settled unilaterally and, through the negotiations it conducted with us, India has once again recognised that fact. Pakistan is a party to the dispute and so are the four million people of Kashmir, whose right of self-determination is at stake.

It may be that the compulsion of the international situation does not permit the Soviet Union to make a radical change in its stand on Kashmir. That is understandable to some extent. But as an immediate first step, a gradual change should lead it to adopt a position of neutrality on the issue and to abandon its partisan attitude. This partisan attitude of the Soviet Union is not in the interest of justice. The Soviet Union should examine the pros and cons of the matter, look at it in the light of the new developments and see the contradiction it is creating. The Soviet Union must do that if it wants friendly and cordial relations with the hundred million people of Pakistan and if it wants to demonstrate to the world that it is interested in the settlement of international disputes on the basis of equity and justice.

Being an Islamic State, Pakistan would like to have friendly and fraternal ties with all Muslim countries, both of Asia and Africa. We are on the best of terms with Iran and Turkey and have recently improved our relations with our neighbour Afghanistan. We desire even greater collaboration with these countries. We wish to have equally good relations with our Asian neighbours to our East and with all of them we are already friendly. Pakistan has the unique distinction of being both in West Asia and in East Asia. More than half of our people live in the eastern part of our country. We can have the optimum degree of collaboration and understanding with the people of Indonesia and Malaysia and the rest of South East Asia. We should like to see this collaboration develop.

Nobody can deny that Kashmir is not a disputed territory. This is well-known; it is internationally recognised. Above all, the Kashmiri people know better than all others that their destiny is in dispute. They, more than any one else, know that their future has yet to be determined. This being the case, is it right or fair, under any rule of international morality and justice, to link Kashmir with India's war with China, to make it the guinea pig of India's aggrandisement and chauvinism? If today Kashmir were part of Pakistan, the life of its people would have been as secure, as tranquil, as that of the people of Hunza or Gilgit or Muzafarabad. But because Kashmir is in the occupation of India, India has chosen this disputed territory to be its battle ground. Today the peace-loving people of Kashmir, who have no quarrel with China, who have rarely known war in their history, find that their land has been ravaged by India's war with China. They have nothing to do with this war.

The problem of Kashmir has to be settled. The world will have to take a realistic attitude about it. It is no longer confined to India and Pakistan. Being of the same pattern, it must end like the great struggle of the people of Algeria for their independence. It can lock into combat the more than 500 million people living in the sub-continent. If a bloody conflict does break out, it will have far-reaching repercussions. Pakistan on its part has always

exercised the greatest restraint and shall continue to do so. But there comes a time when the patience of a people is exhausted. I remember that when the struggle for the achievement of Pakistan was being waged, it was said that it should be a now or never struggle. The problem of Kashmir has now become so urgent, so critical in its consequences, that it should be thought of in the same way. Kashmir must be liberated if Pakistan is to have its full meaning.

In the speeches which are comprised in this volume, and of which I have endeavoured to sum up the pith and substance in this Introduction, the foreign policy of Pakistan has been dealt with as it has evolved during the past two years. Since they were made in the course of the debates that took place from time to time in the National Assembly of Pakistan, the speeches extend over a wide field. In some respects the same theme pervades all of them. That of course is inevitable, because the foreign policy of Pakistan has, as is natural, some permanent features. But broadly four strands will be discernible in these statements, namely relations with India, the Kashmir question, relations with the Western Powers, and Western arms aid to India. These constitute the four most important aspects of Pakistan's foreign policy. It is obvious that they are inter-linked and time has gone on the inter-linking has become more and more pronounced.

In so far as Pakistan's foreign policy is related to other countries, its problems are of significance to those countries too. The strains and stresses created by them have to be borne not by Pakistan alone but also by the other countries concerned. It is, therefore, in their interest as well, that these problems should be properly appreciated and speedy solutions found for them. True, foreign policy questions are often in themselves fascinating and the search for solutions for them exciting. But, for that reason or for any other, the world cannot afford the luxury of keeping alive problems which are an economic burden on nations, large and small, and which carry within them the germ of terrible wars. Statesmen themselves are not personally affected by these economic burdens, but they should realise that their people

are and, they should seek to relieve them of such burdens. Statesmen, whether personally threatened or not by the consequences of war, should also realise how disastrous they are bound to be for their people and for mankind in general. In the context of world affairs, Pakistan's problems might appear to be small, but it is undeniable that they mean what is almost a military confrontation between India and Pakistan; that they aggravate the poverty of their respective peoples; and that they cost the United States and other countries, giving military aid, billions which could be utilized for better purpose, for their own people and for others the world over.

II

Phases of Pakistani Foreign Policy — Indian Hostility — Alternatives for Pakistan — Sino-Indian Conflict — Pakistan and China — Western Arms for India (26th November 1962)

Pakistan has, since its birth, been faced with one crisis after another. But of all of them, the present one is perhaps the most serious, both as regards its nature, and its possible consequences. Without doubt, we are in the vortex of grave historic events, in which the difference between a right and a false move might well mean the difference between survival and disaster. The crisis which we face today, however, is but the reflection of a world torn by a relentless conflict of ideals. Instead of generating hope and providing for an easing of international tensions, the Titans, through their animosity, are leading the world to the brink of total annihilation.

It has been said of great historic figures that they stride the world to make epochs, to bless, confuse or appeal. May I ask what kind of epoch, are the great figures of the present day about to make? In a matter of minutes, cities can be destroyed and an entire countryside laid waste.

For fifteen years the great Powers have talked of disarmament, but with what result? Not a single division has been disbanded, not a single weapon destroyed. Disarmament, like peace, must begin in the minds of men. That process has yet to start. Therefore, to appeal to the nations of the world to lay aside their arms is futile. Across our own borders, we see a stampede towards increasing-national armaments.

As is well known, people in the under-developed countries are on the verge of starvation. That being so, to dissipate whatever resources they have in revengeful warlike ventures will bring no good to these teeming millions.

They dream of new vistas of prosperity which oppressive colonial rule had denied them for centuries.

The present phase is thus one of danger as well as of opportunity. There is myopia and madness enough to bring about utter ruination. But we can still avert the catastrophe and our dreams of a great and glorious future for our people and for others can still be realised.

A united Pakistan can make an important contribution to peace in our region and to a better life for all peoples. Shall we have the will and courage to do that? This is a moment of agonising reappraisal. At this moment we cannot isolate our thoughts from the Sino-Indian conflict in which are involved more than a thousand million people.

From time immemorial, there have been two ways, and there can be only two ways of settling disputes, namely: (a) war, and (b) peaceful means. The Charter of the United Nations makes it obligatory on all states to resolve their disputes by peaceful means.

In the event of a conflict between the great Powers, a resort to arms must defeat the very purpose of going to war. For with the present precarious balance of power; described by Sir Winston Churchill as the balance of terror, there can be neither victor nor vanquished. But, in actual fact peaceful procedures are the only sensible ones also for the settlement of disputes between lesser Powers. This is precisely what has been suggested to India by the Chinese Prime Minister, not once, not twice, but repeatedly.

To our utter astonishment, instead of accepting this as the only sane course open to men of goodwill, India is persisting in the folly of whipping up frenzy against its neighbour, a colossus that cannot be destroyed, a neighbour that only asks for the rectification and adjustment of its borders, as a sovereign equal and not as a colonial vassal. China's call for the demarcation of the

Sino-Indian boundary is not a capricious act. In that sense, it is unlike the ways followed by imperialism since the map of Europe was redrawn at the great Congress of Vienna in 1815 to satisfy the personal ambitions of rulers and the territorial ambitions of powerful nations. I shall revert to the Indo-Chinese conflict a little later. At this stage I should like to say a few words about foreign policy in general.

The foreign policy of a nation is a manifestation of its sovereignty. If a people enjoys all power, except the right to conduct foreign relations, it cannot be regarded as independent. For this reason, people take special pride and interest in their foreign policy. It is the visible aspect of a country's independence.

Stability of government and its concomitant, continuity of policy, are more important in the realm of external affairs than in that of internal affairs.

This does not mean that foreign policy should not be dynamic. It only means that it should not change abruptly. If national interests so demand, foreign policy must change; but the change must be orderly. The shift should be executed gradually, without violent fluctuations like autumn changing into winter or winter into spring.

In fifteen years, ever since independence, Pakistan's foreign policy has passed through three important phases: Phase I marked an attempt to establish the credentials of Pakistan's statehood in the face of massive Indian propaganda that Pakistan was a monstrosity and a transient phenomenon. International recognition in its fullest sense was sought and obtained during those agonising years. But, notwithstanding recognition, the country remained isolated. Taking advantage of that isolation, India, without completely satisfying its gargantuan territorial appetite, swallowed up Hyderabad, Junagadh and a good part of Kashmir.

Phase II saw an attempt to create and establish solidarity with the Islamic world. Considerable misunderstanding arose because of the naivety and extravagance of some of the gestures made by us to achieve this end. We, as a new nation, were not fully versed in the complexities and nuances of international affairs. If our approach had been a measured one, cautious and dignified, the resultant misunderstandings, to use a better word than suspicions, might not have been so harmful. We tried to over-simplify a complex problem. This was the painful period of our greatest disillusionment.

Relying too literally on the Islamic precept that all Muslims are brothers, we sought to create a brotherhood of Muslim peoples at a time when the force of Arab nationalism was in full flood; and its ideological basis was different from that of our own nation. The Arab States were under various types of political regimes, and were divided amongst themselves. They could not unite even in the face of the Israeli menace. How then could they have been expected to collaborate with the new-born non-Arab nation of Pakistan in the pursuit of an ethereal ideal?

Pakistan came into being in 1947 and Israel was established in 1948. The word "partition" became poison to the Arabs. Intensive propaganda was unleashed in the Arab nations to the effect that the British, out of vicious parting spite and in accordance with their old policy of "divide and rule", sought to lacerate the Arab world, in a manner similar to what they had done in India. This propaganda, although wholly false, did create in certain Arab circles a resentment against the division of the sub-continent and, consequently, against Pakistan.

Pakistan, however, made strenuous efforts to create goodwill in the Arab world. Our endeavours in the cause of the Arab peoples are seldom remembered. Repeatedly, we are reminded of the blunders committed by Pakistan during the Suez crisis. It is relevant that this only flaw in our policy towards the Arab States came at a time when internal confusion in Pakistan

had reached its high water mark. That flaw has now become the cause of permanent resentment and slander against Pakistan. This, notwithstanding the fact that the balance-sheet, with Suez on the debit side, is wholly favourable to Pakistan. I beseech you to note the significant contribution Pakistan has made to the cause of the Arab people:

a) Pakistan was the most eloquent opponent of the State of Israel and, to this day, we have refused to have any dealings with that State. On the other hand, India, the neutral friend of a powerful neutral Arab country, has considerably improved its relations with Israel;

(b) Our continued political, moral and financial support to the cause of the Palestine Arab refugees; and

(c) Our endeavours in the United Nations for the independence of Libya, Somalia, Eritrea, Morocco, Tunisia and, finally, our support for the independence of Algeria.

It has been said that our role in the Algerian crisis should have been more forthright. There must be some consistency in our thought and action. We have always said that Kashmir was the most fundamental question for Pakistan. At the same time, some people wanted us to jeopardise our position about Kashmir in the Security Council, of which France is a permanent member, by giving recognition to Algeria. Even if the United Nations alone cannot settle the Kashmir dispute, the question is, nevertheless, pending before it. For the sake of argument, suppose we had given de facto recognition to Algeria three years earlier than we did, would that have brought freedom to Algeria? If our recognition had any chance of preventing further bloodshed, we might have taken the risk for the sake of the great and heroic people of Algeria. But such was not the case. Despite our high stake in the favourable disposition of the Security Council, in which France has always given Pakistan unequivocal support, we incurred the risk of alienating France by recognising the Provisional Government when Algeria

needed it most. And this we did much before it was recognized by India, a country which proclaims itself to be the champion of moral causes.

The Muslim world is not confined to the Arab States. It includes Turkey, Iran, Malaysia, Indonesia, the countries of the Maghreb and many other countries of Africa. Most of these countries were themselves going through a metamorphosis. In their effort to survive and reconstruct their national life, they could not hope to draw much strength from our people, suffering from the same problems as themselves.

We had to adjust our approach not only to the rivalries of the Arab States inter se but also to the Arab-Turkish and the Arab-Iranian tensions—tensions which are deeply rooted in history.

Basically, the forces of nationalism clashed with the spirit of resurgent Islamic sentiment that flowed from the new State of Pakistan. Besides, we were so wholly beset by our internal problems that we could not make a full effort in pursuit of the grandiose mission of creating a fraternal rallying centre for the Muslim States. Had we succeeded, it might have been the greatest development in contemporary international relations. However, the irresistible and irrepressible forces of nationalism burst forth like a mighty flood, sweeping all before it.

We succeeded, nevertheless, in evoking sympathy and support in the Muslim countries of Iran and Turkey. But, in these two countries also, the drive towards modernism has brought about conflicts between orthodox and progressive forces, so much so that Islam as a political factor does not count in either of them.

Our friendship with the great people of Turkey and Iran is something highly significant. These countries have been our steadfast friends in all our

difficulties and we deeply value the warm feelings which exist between their people and ours.

Before proceeding to the third phase, I shall make a brief reference to the Foreign Office. Many uncharitable attacks have been made on the Foreign Office for its alleged failure to project the proper image of Pakistan in the Muslim world.

It is admitted that the Foreign Office suffers from certain obvious limitations. It must not, however, be forgotten that, in this shrinking world of ours, in which communications have reached a point of near perfection, there is little scope for ambassadors and envoys plenipotentiary to bring about a decisive change in the attitudes of the countries to which they are accredited. In this jet age, distance is no longer a factor. The ambassador has been short-circuited by direct links between heads of governments and heads of states. In modern diplomacy, the role of the ambassador does not have the importance which it had in the past, when ambassadors were allowed to act on their own authority and initiative. Today they exercise only a marginal influence on the attitudes of foreign governments. They are no longer expected to take independent decisions. They merely communicate the policy of the government they represent to the government to which they are accredited. It is, therefore, the foreign policy of a country which is of supreme importance.

During the last four years, I have had considerable dealings with The Foreign Office. I have on two occasions led our Delegations to the United Nations and have represented Pakistan on several important missions. On these occasions I have sought to establish personal contacts with most of our foreign service representatives. I have had the opportunity to observe their work closely.

In my opinion, there are a number of incompetent persons in the foreign service and if it were in my hands, I would have sent them packing long ago.

Perhaps, that day might still come. Having said this, I should like to state emphatically, that by and large, our foreign service is the cream of the country's public services. Individuals are not chosen by subjective procedures; they are chosen on the basis of an examination of a high standard. Those selected for the foreign service are generally those who top the list of successful candidates. It is by this criterion alone that we have built up our foreign service. If there is something wrong with the foreign service, which represents the highest intellectual standards of the country, then there is something wrong with those standards. It is not proper to generalise and put too much blame on the Foreign Office and those who represent Pakistan abroad. Most of them are working under very difficult conditions. Many of our young men, who are talented and dedicated, would be a source of pride to any country. I have seen some of them working under great stress and strain and doing excellent work. In some places, a single individual acts as a cypher officer, an office assistant as well as a diplomat. It would not be fair, therefore, to brand the whole Foreign Office as inefficient and incapable. Apart from the fact that such condemnation is not justified, it would have the effect of demoralising our foreign service most of whose officers are doing splendid work abroad.

I now return to the third phase of our country's foreign policy. After having exhausted our natural urge to bring about solidarity in, the Muslim world, we sought to break our isolation by linking ourselves with the West. To that end we began negotiations with the West. When these had advanced sufficiently, on 17th November 1953, The Government of the United States of America formally informed the Government of India that it was considering a Military Assistance Agreement with Pakistan in order to strengthen the free world's defences in South Asia. As a result of this development, we came to be associated with the three Muslim States of Iran, Turkey and Iraq—the only Arab State—in a pact of mutual co-operation signed between Iraq and Turkey in February 1955, and acceded to by Pakistan in September 1955.

This was a turning point in our history. The critical and dangerous period of our isolation was over and we were now aligned with nations which were prepared to come to our assistance in the event of Communist aggression against us.

The full measure of an achievement can be judged fairly and accurately by its effect, such as satisfaction among one's friends and anger or fear among one's adversaries. What was the reaction in India to our joining the Pacts? The whole Indian nation went hoarse in condemning Pakistan's alliance with the Western countries.

I shall refer only to a few of the utterances in this connection, of the Indian Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. In a speech in November 1953, he said:

"It is a matter of the most intense concern to us and something which will have more far-reaching consequences on the whole structure of things in South Asia and specially on India and Pakistan. I am rather surprised, therefore, that this very major development should take place in the way in which apparently it is taking place.

"It is open to Pakistan to have bases, to have foreign arms, to have anything it likes on its territory. It is even open to it to give up its independence, if it so chooses, or to limit it; but we are concerned with the consequences of these pacts and, therefore, necessarily we are watching these developments with the greatest care."

On 22nd March 1954, Mr. Nehru was quoted as saying:

"I venture to say that it is not easy to imagine even any aggression on Pakistan, as things are, either from that great country, China, or from India, regardless of motives. How then does this question of aggression arise suddenly and is made a pretext for this kind of military aid being given? From Pakistan's side I am only unaware of any possible reason which I can understand.

"For my part I would welcome the strengthening of Pakistan economically and even militarily in the normal sense. If they build themselves up, I can have no complaint. But this is not normal procedure. It is a very abnormal procedure, upsetting normalcy; and insofar as it upsets normalcy, it is a step away from peace.

"Now the President of the United States has stated that if the aid given to Pakistan is misused and directed against any country for aggression, he will undertake to thwart such an aggression. I have no doubt that the President is opposed to aggression. But we know from past experiences that aggression takes place and nothing is done to thwart it. The military aid given by the United States to Pakistan is likely to create conditions which facilitate and encourage aggression.

"As I have said repeatedly, this grant of military aid by the United States to Pakistan creates a grave situation for us in India and for Asia. It adds to our tensions; it makes it much more difficult to solve the problems, which have confronted India and Pakistan."

On 22nd March 1956, Mr. Nehru in a speech in the Indian Lok Sabha, stated that while a war between India and Pakistan was unlikely, one could not ignore the possibility of some emergency arising. Pakistan, he said, had received military aid and this posed a terrible problem for India from the point of view of the diversion of her resources from development to military needs. Mr. Nehru said that he was intervening in the debate to draw the attention of the House to certain broad and basic principles underlying defence. He had noted in the course of the debate a certain anxiety and concern about recent events, "amounting to almost an apprehension and fear lest India might be attacked by our neighbour country (Pakistan) and we might not be ready for it. It is perfectly true that the situation today in regard to the defence of India has been very much affected by this factor of

military aid coming in from a great country. We have to view this situation, therefore, in this new light."

By way of a final instance, I shall refer to Mr. Nehru's remarks in the Rajya Sabha on 6th March, 1959, when he is reported to have stated :

"I would like to add that during the past few weeks when talks about this pact have been going on, we have drawn the attention of the U.S. Government to our concern about such pacts and more specially the prospect of this agreement leading to greater military aid to Pakistan, and even otherwise affecting us adversely ... We have been assured all along by the representatives of the U.S. Government that this (aid) was aimed . . . against communist aggression ...

"We have been specifically assured that this agreement (the bilateral agreement between the United States and Pakistan) cannot be used against India . . . We have repeatedly pointed out that the United States defence aid to Pakistan encourages the Pakistan authorities in their aggressiveness and increases tension and conflict between India and Pakistan ...

"We welcome the assurance given to us by the United States authorities but aggression is difficult to define, and Pakistan authorities have in the past committed aggression and continued it ... It is difficult for us to ignore the possibility of Pakistan utilising the aid received by it from other countries against India, even though those other countries have given us clear assurances to the contrary."

Let us now turn to foreign policy in the context of the present international situation. This situation is such as to afford us little scope for manoeuvrability. In the formation of foreign policy today there are three courses open to nations:

(1) Alliance with the Western democracies;

(2) Alliance with or, to be more accurate, subservience to Communist states; and

(3) An un-coordinated fraternization with the neutralist states. Since the end of the Second World War, despite the strenuous efforts made to strengthen the rule of law through the United Nations, there has been a definite bipolarisation of power. The world has been split into two camps—the Communist and the non-Communist. During the last fifteen years, on more than one occasion, the world has come to the brink of disaster. The intense rivalry between the two power blocs is leading humanity towards a dangerous crisis and confronting it with the awesome possibility of a nuclear war. Should such a war break out, civilization will be in ashes. Ideologies and social systems will form part of the debris. The endeavours that have so far been made to abate this rivalry between the blocs have not succeeded.

The United Nations is still the most encouraging instrument of peace in the hands of man. Despite its inadequacies, it has, on numerous occasions, interposed its pacifying counsel to save the world from scourge of total war, as in the case of Suez, Berlin, the Congo and, most recently, Cuba. In fact, its intervention in such circumstances has become essential for the resolution of disputes between nations.

In recent years a third force has been evolving. It claims to act as a restraining influence on the passions of the major rivals. This is the force of the neutralist states whose numbers are growing. But they lack intrinsic strength and the means to transform their nebulous ideals into a bridge between the two nuclear colossuses.

I have described the third course as ambiguous because the neutral states have no positive mission backed by a readiness to assume the multilateral obligations, which that mission would entail. They claim to dispose of each issue on its merits. But in assuming this posture, they are often divided amongst themselves. Even collectively, they are not sufficiently powerful to

play a decisive role in the settlement of disputes. More important, the fact is that neither the Soviet Union nor Communist China recognises as final the validity of the role of this so-called third force. Stalin called it a deception. Mao Tse-tung has often said that a third road does not exist. "To sit on the fence," he said as far back as July 1948, "is impossible. A third road does not exist. Not only in China but also in the world, without exception, one either leans to the side of imperialism or socialism."

It is only in recent years that the pragmatic Mr. Khrushchev, acting on Lenin's strategy of "two steps forward, one step back" has eulogised the role of neutralism in the quest for peaceful co-existence. He has, consequently, been accused by Communist China of a revisionist performance. In the United States of America, John Foster Dulles, the astute architect of contemporary American diplomacy, termed neutralism as "immoral". In the United States also it is but recently that Harvard intellectuals, the Kissingers and Schlesingers, have deviated from the traditional path, to lionise neutralism, much to the detriment of America's long-term vital interests.

Among the neutralist countries, the role of India, up to the present at least, has been the most active. India has been the piper that has played the tune which, on the whole, has sounded jarring only to the West.

The main driving force behind a nation's foreign policy is its urge to maintain its independence and territorial integrity. Pakistan, situated as it is, surrounded by hostile neighbours, must seek arrangements guaranteeing its territorial integrity and permitting it to preserve its distinct ideological personality. The degree of a nation's external dependence is conditioned by its internal strength and stability, the vitality of its institutions and the strength of its national purpose. Time and again, we have been told that our alliances with the West have robbed us of our independence. This is not correct.

In the present international balance of power, there are hardly three or four states which can claim to be sovereign in the absolute sense of the term. Furthermore, the progress of international law has made it incumbent even on these few states to shed a part of their sovereignty. Membership of the United Nations entails far-reaching restrictions on the sovereignty of its member states.

The Charter of the United Nations calls upon its members to renounce some of the most important aspects of the classical form of sovereignty, e.g., the right to make war. Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the Charter declares:

"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."

The member states are, therefore, obliged not to resort to force or the threat of force. They are called upon to accept a settlement of their international disputes by peaceful means.

Incidentally, I should like the House to note that this is the very principle which India has, ever since its independence, been consistently preaching to all states but which India itself has persistently violated and continues to violate in its own international dealings.

To return to my main point, I submit that the degree of independence of a country within the four corners of international law is determined more by the country's own strength and will to independence than by its external affiliations, such as the membership of Pacts. Indeed, the ability of a country to enter into a treaty or a Pact is itself a demonstration of its independence. No dependent country is competent to conclude a treaty.

If Pakistanis feel that they are not independent enough, they themselves are to blame for it and not the fact of their membership of the Pacts. We should

do everything in our power to develop our internal resources and decrease our economic dependence on outside sources of assistance. Our economic dependence on foreign Powers is in no way related to our membership of the Pacts.

I have scrutinised every word of the relevant treaties in an attempt to discover if there is any provision stipulating that Pakistan's internal budget is to be supported by counterpart funds or by PL-480 funds. If we are able to mobilise our own resources, it would be a relief to us as well as to those who assist us.

Pakistan is not the first or the only recipient of foreign aid. The United States of America literally pulled Europe out of economic degradation through massive aid under the Marshall Plan. Germany, defeated and divided, destroyed and decimated by the combined might of the Allied Powers, was a debris but only a decade ago. By skilful utilisation of foreign aid and the determination to be free of it, Germany has burgeoned into a mighty power. Today its economy is as vital as that of the country which not very long ago gave it economic aid.

In the same manner, among other Western European nations, France, Italy and the United Kingdom have been enabled to regain their economic independence through Marshall Aid.

If the purpose of the aid were to make countries permanently dependent on foreign assistance, these great European States would not have been able to revive their economies with the infusion of aid. It is, therefore, the betrayal of a senile complex to assert that economic aid carries with it the virus of permanent dependence.

Time magazine in its issue of 23rd November 1962, has made certain interesting comments on foreign aid. It reports:

"Within the Kennedy Administration, a process of rethinking the ends and means of foreign aid is under way. The inevitable New Frontier 'task force' has been appointed, and among its basic texts is a tough minded article by the University of Chicago's Professor Hans Morgenthau in the June issue of the American Political Science Review.

"Morgenthau takes a scholarly scalp to the concept of economic development aid. It has, he says, 'a very much smaller range of potentially successful operation than is generally believed'. Many under-developed countries 'suffer from deficiencies, some natural and insuperable, others social and remediable, which no amount of capital and technological know-how, supplied from the outside, can cure'. There are 'bum and beggar nations' that, unless a 'miraculous transformation' of character takes place, cannot or will not use foreign aid for genuine economic development."

It is against our national pride to be called a "bum and beggar nation". But, let us at this time of the agonising reappraisal of our policies indict ourselves for the weaknesses for which we alone are responsible.

I have always advocated the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China. I do not believe that our membership of the Pacts is incompatible with such an approach. It was in pursuance of this objective that I sponsored the conclusion of the Oil Agreement between Pakistan and the Soviet Union. There is a great deal of territory on which we can meet the Communist world as friends in the common cause of preserving world peace.

We, as a nation of nearly one hundred million people, the fifth largest in the world, can play a role in the normalization of international relations and in the reduction of international tensions. The Soviet Union is our close neighbour. In the long and stormy march of history, our paths have often crossed. There has been an intermingling of races and cultures in our two regions. The great heritage which scions of the House of Timur brought to us from what today is Soviet Central Asia, inspires us and will continue to

inspire us. During my visit to Samarkand, Tashkent and other places in those parts, I was amazed to witness the great affinity of cultures and outlook between their people and ours. I was amazed because, in spite of the high mountains that separate us and the lack of contacts during the past centuries, there was abundant evidence of the indissoluble links between our two regions. We extend the hand of friendship to the Soviet Union on terms of equality and self-respect. However, the Soviet Union, for its own reasons, has been unsympathetic to us in respect of a problem which is fundamental to our future. Until it can better appreciate the objective merits of that problem, I am afraid that, despite all our wishes, we cannot completely normalize our relations with that great country.

The case of the People's Republic of China is entirely different. We admire the People's Republic of China for not having adopted a hostile stand on Kashmir, in spite of the fact that in the past our relations with that great Asian neighbour of ours were not as cordial as they are today. In a book called Panchsheela and after, written by Girilal Jain, the author has said:

"During Mr. Chou En-lai's visit to India in 1956-57, the Chinese Prime Minister was repeatedly asked to define his Government's policy on the issue of the Indo-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. Mr. Chou En-lai was, unlike the Soviet leaders, noncommittal. This lends some indirect confirmation to unconfirmed reports then prevalent in New Delhi that the Chinese rulers were not wholly averse to the idea of having a deal with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue."

Let us be big enough to admit our faults, for which the present Government is not responsible. When the Central Government of the People's Republic of China was established, we recognised their new regime and initially supported its admission to the United Nations. Thereafter, advantage was taken of our domestic confusion and weakness and, presumably under pressure, we reversed our position. For a number of years, we did not support the People's Republic of China's admission to the United Nations.

Now, it is not unnatural for friendly countries to persuade one another to accept a particular point of view. This is a part of international relations. For instance, even in domestic affairs, as Minister of Industries, I might try to persuade the Commerce Minister to accept my point of view, but if he rejects it, that does not mean that he has not succumbed to my "pressure".

What is tragic is the willingness to succumb easily to pressures. This inevitably happens when there is internal weakness. The very fact that the same allies could not prevail upon the present Government to continue the previous policy against the admission of Communist China to the United Nations is evidence of the independence of our present foreign policy, even within the context of our alliances. On merits, we have been able to revert to our original stand because the present Government is strong and stable enough to do so. We have in the past two years supported the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. It would be beneficial to all mankind if the People's Republic of China were to become a member of the World Organisation. How is it possible for the United Nations to bring to bear the full weight of authority on any issue when the representatives of 650 million people are excluded from its deliberations and discipline?

Without further ado, let me declare that we have no ill-will against China, that we have no territorial disputes with that country, that our relations with it are normal and cordial, and that we appreciate the attitude of China on the Kashmir question and that attitude, we hope, will become more positive with further improvement in our mutual relations.

For its part China has assured us that our membership of the Pacts with the West is in no way incompatible with our friendship with China. This friendship is unshakable and unconditional.

It has been reported that the Central People's Government of China has offered a non-aggression Pact to Pakistan. This offer cannot be regarded as

inconsistent with our alliances with the West. Our alliances are for self-defence. A non-aggression Pact further reinforces the defensive character of those alliances.

I declare that our friendship with China is not tainted by any form of bargain or barter. It is steadfast amity between two neighbouring Asian States comprising over 750 million people.

We can maintain a posture of friendship with the People's Republic of China and of normalization of relations with the Soviet Union. We can do that without violating the sanctity of our Pacts with our Western allies, who were the first to enable us to break out of our isolation.

As far as the neutral states are concerned, we have tried to maintain normal relations with all of them. If our relations with the UAR were not happy a number of years ago, the fault is not that of this Government. Ever since the revolutionary regime came into power, it has sought sedulously to improve relations with the United Arab Republic and with all other Middle Eastern and African countries, including Nigeria, Ghana and the Arab States of the Maghreb. It has also sought to improve relations with other important neutralist states, notably Yugoslavia.

Having broadly dealt with the three political divisions of the world, I should now like to briefly address myself to all those who call upon us to abandon the Pacts and become "scrupulously neutral". Under the present circumstances it cannot be denied that India is the lynch-pin of the neutralist combination. Therefore, if we were to pitch our tent in the neutralist camp, we would become subject to Indian hegemony and to its machiavellian manoeuvres. Until the Kashmir dispute is settled, we cannot think of becoming a part of a sphere of influence dominated by India.

I do not think there is anyone in Pakistan who would like this country to become a satellite of a heterogeneous concert of relatively weak and

vacillating nations, of which India is the leader. Moreover, to what extent and how effectively the neutralist countries came to India's rescue in its present conflict with China is all too well-known.

The Commonwealth of Nations cannot be regarded as a separate ideological sphere of influence. Its older members are in the Western camp and most of the new ones are in the neutralist camp. However, our relations with almost all the Commonwealth countries are very cordial.

Britain has been much maligned. It has been said that Britain was against the partition and that the last Viceroy of the Indian Empire and the first Governor-General of independent India, Lord Mountbatten, was hostile to Pakistan. Be that as it may. All that is part of history. We have to reckon with its legacy. One of the weaknesses, or shall I say virtues, of the Anglo-Saxon is that he is, basically, a realist. As such, the Anglo-Saxon has no permanent attitudes. Moreover, it is given to that race to grudgingly admire those that come into conflict with it. The classic example is that of Germany. There is no doubt that the British admired and at one time feared the indomitable spirit and courage of the Muslims. In their bid for a world empire they found in Islam their most formidable foe.

The great British historian Arnold Toynbee, in his book *Civilisation on Trial*, observes:

"Centuries before Communism was heard of, our ancestors found their bugbear in Islam. As lately as the sixteenth century. Islam inspired the same hysteria in Western hearts as Communism in the twentieth century, and this essentially for the same reason. Like Communism, Islam was an anti-Western movement which was at the same time a heretical version of a Western faith; and, like Communism, it wielded a sword of the spirit against which there was no defence in material armaments."

But, when the dictates of reality demanded, the British suppressed their traditional hostility to Islam and supported the Turkish Empire against Czarist Russia's expansionist urges. Historical memories are most profound among those with whom swords have been crossed. The bravery of the Muslims remains a living legend in Britain.

Today, however, the British are more to be sympathised with than to be envied. Their great Empire, on which the sun never set, is now shrunk to a small and vulnerable island, open to complete destruction by thermo-nuclear weapons. Napoleon Bonaparte called the British a nation of shop-keepers. Today its shops have become part of a European Market and Britannia cannot tilt the scales of power one way or the other. We have no rancour against Britain, but if it influences the United States to upset the balance of power in this region, it will be committing a hostile act against Pakistan. We shall be forced to take notice of that act and shall not be responsible for its consequences.

I should now like to refer to some of our neighbours.

Although Afghanistan is a Muslim State, it has, unfortunately, from the very beginning, pursued an incomprehensible inimical policy towards Pakistan. We, on the other hand, have exercised restraint in the face of continuous provocation. On numerous occasions, Pakistan has sought to improve its relations with Afghanistan. But that country, obviously in order to distract its people's attention from internal stresses, has endeavoured to channel all their bitterness in the direction of Pakistan by making fictitious claims to our territory.

Every inch of Pakistani territory is sacred and inviolable. Unless and until, therefore, Afghanistan abandons the pursuit of its peurile expansionist aims, none can expect an improvement in the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan and none can hold Pakistan responsible for the present state of those relations.

Nepal, very near to East Pakistan, is our proximate neighbour. Notwithstanding this proximity, in the past our contacts with Nepal were restricted. Since the Revolution, our relations with that country have steadily improved. About a year ago, King Mahendra was our honoured guest in Pakistan. We have exchanged several important delegations with Nepal. I might add that constructive efforts are being made by the Government of Pakistan for further developing relations with Nepal.

I now come to India and to the core of our problems. A little over 15 years ago we were citizens of the same country striving for its liberation from the yoke of British colonialism. Because of fundamental differences we parted company and became two separate nation States. Many of us had hoped that the bitterness of the past would be dissolved as each State pursued its own policies according to its own interpretation of the values of life. Much to our regret this has not happened.

Immediately before and after the transfer of power a vast number of people lost their lives. The aftermath of that event was one of horror. The greatest of all migrations known to history took place. There was danger of war between the two countries.

Pakistan, as the smaller country, faced with many more problems and possessing far less resources than India, was the more anxious of the two to come to a settlement of the disputes between them and to live as a good neighbour and, indeed, to establish a permanent modus vivendi with India. This policy of peace did not fit into the grand design of India, which was to bring about the disintegration of Pakistan, amongst other things, by creating turmoil and disorder. Instead of passing over the tragic events of 1947 the Indian Government chose to exacerbate the tensions created by the partition. Every step of Indian policy has been taken with the aim of strangulating Pakistan. In this respect the policy of the Indian Government has remained rigid and uncompromising. There is a concatenation of

instances as proof of this but I would not like to mention every one of them, for that enumeration would in no way help to improve the situation. It would only pile pain upon the existing agony.

In the very first instance, India refused to honour the financial settlement that was explicitly agreed to as a part of the process of the transfer of power. So unreasonable and damaging to India's reputation was this attitude that even Gandhi objected to it and threatened to go on a hunger strike as a protest against it. Pakistan had, in the meanwhile, taken the matter to the Security Council. India, unable to defend itself before that body, partly fulfilled the agreement. It is not that Gandhi was charitable to Pakistan, but he seemed so. For that reason he was killed by the bullet of a Hindu fanatic who represented that powerful element in India's life which openly seeks the liquidation of Pakistan.

Finance is the blood-stream of a nation, particularly that of a new nation, born in chaos and striving desperately for survival. The Indian Government believed that by not honouring the financial settlement, which formed part of the partition arrangement and by not transferring to Pakistan its pre-determined share of the financial assets of undivided India, the economic arteries of Pakistan would be drained of life. To make that more certain, the division and transfer of defence assets and personnel was hampered at every step, with the obvious purpose of denying the new State the means to defend itself. Pakistan never received anything of its share of weapons and vehicles.

The gigantic evacuee property problem, which was the by-product of the migration, also placed Pakistan in a very difficult position. India chose to complicate and delay the solution of the problem. By keeping it unsolved and enlarging its scope, our neighbour forced upon us the stupendous task of rehabilitating the refugees and solving the question of their properties. As if these were not problems enough, the explosive issues of Junagadh and

Kashmir and Hyderabad were precipitated. An already tense situation was converted into a conflagration. India marched its armies into Junagadh, Kashmir and Hyderabad in a manner reminiscent of the trampling Nazi jack boots of Hitler's Germany seeking lebensraum.

The western part of Pakistan, as every one knows, is wholly dependent on its rivers which irrigate every acre of its cultivable lands. Without these waters. West Pakistan, a most fertile region, would be a veritable desert. India has acquired by its illegal military occupation of Kashmir, the power to stop those waters. Another lethal weapon was thus added to India's armoury for aggression against Pakistan.

These major problems do not include the multitude of irritants, such as incidents of various kinds on the borders of East and West Pakistan and attempts to tamper with East Pakistan rivers. To climax all this animosity, India has repeatedly declared that Pakistan is its Enemy No. 1 and deploys more than two-thirds of its armed forces against Pakistan.

We have been the victim of the combined strength of India's political, economic and military might. Furthermore, by its resourceful propaganda and skilful diplomacy in the chancelleries of the world, India has, behind the facade of its deceptive policy of non-violence and the myth of its peaceful heritage, sought to put Pakistan in the wrong in the eyes of the world. Thus a State, which actually is the victim of India's aggressive actions has been depicted by India as pursuing against it a policy of unwarranted ill-will. This atrocious attempt is without parallel in the history of international relations.

The heart of the Indo-Pakistan problems lies in the Kashmir dispute and in India's arrogant refusal to settle that dispute. India has violated every single agreement entered into by it with regard to Kashmir. On all occasions, Pakistan has agreed to compromise proposals for a settlement. India has rejected every one of them. At one time, during the premiership of Mr.

Liaquat Ali Khan, at the Commonwealth Conference in London, it was suggested that Commonwealth troops be posted in Kashmir to ensure a free expression of the will of the people. India rejected that proposal on the ground that the presence of foreign troops on the soil of Kashmir would give the impression that imperialism had returned to the sub-continent. Is it not ironical, that today, India is literally pleading for the presence on her soil of foreign troops and foreign armaments to help in its border clash with China?

It is believed that Military Missions from the United States and Great Britain have visited the NEFA front and have now become the brains trust of the General Headquarters of the Indian Army. Their presence and their advice have been welcomed in India and are said to have given a sense of security to that country. According to India this is not to be regarded as the return of imperialism, but for refusing the stationing of Commonwealth troops in the disputed territory of Kashmir, that was the pretext.

The conflict in regard to Kashmir, painful to all who cherish the cause of peace, is the greatest tragedy of our times. India has dishonoured all its pledges to settle the dispute by means of a plebiscite. But that is not all. As recently stated in this House by its leader, Mr. Mohammed Ali of Bogra, India has taken its stand on the doctrine of "Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus". This doctrine and the other, "Pactas unt Servanda", are important in international law. The latter doctrine calls for a rigid adherence to treaties. Under it all peace-loving states are enjoined to carry out their undertakings. The former doctrine gives an opening to adventurous states unilaterally to wriggle out of commitments, voluntarily undertaken by them. By its refusal to honour its pledged word on Kashmir, India has done precisely this and has sought justification for it by evoking this doctrine of dubious moral value. However, it is not given to individual countries themselves to determine whether circumstances have changed or changed so much as to justify the repudiation of a treaty or of a part of it. Obviously, a third party has to determine whether circumstances have really altered, and if so, to what

extent. India's former Defence Minister, Mr. Krishna Menon, said in the Security Council that circumstances had changed because of Pakistan's accepting American assistance, and that these changed circumstances rendered the agreement about a plebiscite inoperative. India wants to be the judge in its own case,

I should like to make a reference to the recent fighting between India and China. We know that it is only a border clash, and our view has been substantiated by subsequent events and confirmed by the unilateral cease-fire and the withdrawal of forces on the part of the Chinese. Hostilities have come to an end and China, of its own accord, has at the height of its successes stopped the fighting. Indeed, it could not have demonstrated its peaceful intentions in a more positive fashion than by ordering a unilateral cease-fire, a demonstration for which it would be difficult to find a precedent.

The People's Republic of China has thus shown its eagerness to settle the dispute peacefully rather than by the use of force. The Charter of the United Nations enjoins that all disputes should be settled by peaceful means. Thus China, which is not a member of the United Nations, has respected its Charter. India, which is a prominent member of that organisation, has ignored it.

India's attitude in this dispute has been unpredictable. But, whatever it be, she has sought to extract the maximum advantage from the present situation. A climate of war hysteria has been created by the Indian Government, mainly for two purposes: (a) to unite a country that was rapidly falling apart, for, in the face of external danger, people do tend to come together, and (b) to grab foreign military assistance in a massive way. These are both vital purposes. In order to realise them, war-drums are being beaten throughout the length and breadth of India.

As I said in the beginning, this is a phantom war for a bankrupt cause. This is a phony war, so much so that Prime Minister Nehru himself in a broadcast to his nation on 21st October said:

"We are in the middle of our Third Five-Year Plan. There can be no question of giving up this Plan or reducing any important element of it. We may adapt it to the new requirements here and there. But, essentially the major projects of the Plan must be pursued and implemented, because it is in that way that we shall strengthen our country, not only in the present crisis but in the years to come."

When India's Third Five-Year Plan was framed, its whole emphasis was on peace-time economic development and on the assumption that India would be free from the dangers of war or conflict. It was based on the assumption that India would not face a military conflict. That being the premise of the Plan, it is difficult to understand how under war conditions, it has not become necessary to make radical departures from the principles and objectives of the Plan. To "adapt it here and there" is not what a war situation would demand. It is because the so-called war with China is no more than a border conflict, restricted in its scope and its objective, that the Plan may have to be adapted only "here and there" without making any major changes in it.

On 1st November 1962, the Indian Government, after very careful consideration, finally decided against resorting to any drastic action to regulate the prices of food grains and other essential commodities. The Indian Government, "at its highest level" considered it advisable to "pursue broadly existing policies". The Food Ministry was of the view that "there was no need for any concern now about the availability or prices of food grains". This important decision was announced by the Government of India on 2nd November and the same day it was carried by all the newspapers.

This is another indication of the fact that the Government of India does not consider itself at war with another State. If India was genuinely involved in a war, or had to make preparations for it, drastic measures to control prices, and particularly those of necessary commodities, such as food and clothing, would have become inevitable in a semi-controlled economy like that of India's.

The decision, on the part of India, to maintain normal policies, and, the unilateral cease-fire ordered by the Government of China, clearly indicate that the dispute between India and China is confined to the "border question.

Mr. Krishna Menon has been made a scapegoat. He was at least frank enough to give expression to the feeling existing in India against Pakistan, and for that he should be given credit. He represented and reflected the Indians' prevailing genuine feeling of animosity against Pakistan and the intensity of that sentiment. There was no Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde in Mr. Krishna Menon. However, even after his unceremonious dismissal, many think he continues to influence Indian policies from behind the scene. Mr. Krishna Menon, I fear, will continue to dominate the Government of India's attitude towards Pakistan.

The new Defence Minister is a Maharashtrian. He has been chosen for this post to inject a martial spirit into the Indian Government. He is the modern Shivaji. The other day he boasted that (38)

"Never in my life have I known defeat. I will not have it now. Let not China forget that side by side with Lord Buddha and Mahaveer, India also produced Rana Pratap and Shivaji."

The new Defence Minister warned the Chinese to remember that— "The enemy hordes which had won battles in the plains of India had met their Waterloo in the mountainous region of the Deccan."

These are chauvinistic remarks, perhaps intended to be reassuring to the country that was badly mauled and humiliated in the recent border conflict. We are not concerned with the internal changes in the Indian Government, except to the extent that we cannot be expected to embrace the new Shivaji and meet the fate of Afzal Khan. In many ways a Krishna Menon with a loaded pistol pointed at us is to be preferred to the craftily hidden claws of a Shivaji. We have been embraced before by a Shivaji and we know with what result.

All recent developments in India, including cabinet changes, are part of a well-conceived plan, whose aim is to inveigle America and to play on American fears of international Communism. That Nehru has succeeded in creating this situation redounds to his credit, but it is not very flattering to Anglo-American diplomacy.

It is obvious that Nehru has refused a peaceful settlement of the dispute with China in order to derive from it the maximum advantage in the form of the massive arms aid rushed to India by the Western Powers. To get these arms, Nehru has had to break his own image and to violate his much-trumpeted doctrine of Panchsheela. Gone is the proud voice of neutralism. That image has been broken and that doctrine shattered. India, the friend of all except Pakistan, finds herself alone and isolated. Self-assurance and self-confidence have given way to alarm and despondency, for it is now clear that the Indian giant was only the shadow of a small man.

It must be regretfully recognised that the Western Powers want to entice India into their bloc and to aggravate its conflict with China. They want to take obvious advantage of India's desperation and want India to depend upon them. It is not unusual in diplomacy to take advantage of opportunities as they present themselves, but even then certain formalities are as a rule observed. In the present case, the Western Powers went through no formalities whatever before seducing India into their sphere of influence.

India is refusing a peaceful settlement of the problem although, during all these past years, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru has been preaching to all countries sermons on the peaceful settlement of disputes.

The People's Republic of China has made a peaceful offer and has, in the interest of an amicable settlement, unilaterally put an end to the fighting. India has, however, refused to accept the offer. This refusal constitutes a flagrant repudiation of India's peaceful posture in international affairs and of the spirit of Nehru's sermons on the virtues of the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Pakistan has a legitimate cause to feel concerned over India's growing military strength and the massive military aid given to India by Pakistan's Western allies. Our own apprehensions apart, in the interest of world peace and especially the peace of this region, we ask the Indian Government to settle its dispute with China through peaceful negotiations on an honourable and equitable basis.

There is nothing so difficult about the present dispute between India and China that it cannot be settled by peaceful means. China contends that it has to rectify its boundary, which is a legacy of British colonial rule. This was admitted by Prime Minister Nehru many years ago in his *Glimpses of World History*. In that book, Nehru said that Imperialism usurped large areas of China. The rectification of the MacMahon Line is a part of the struggle of China to set right the wrongs done to it by colonial powers.

In *Glimpses of World History*, Mr. Nehru has said:

"Having seen how India was exploited in the nineteenth century by the industrialists and capitalists of Britain, let us go to the other great country of Asia, India's old-time friend, that ancient among nations, China. We shall find here a different type of exploitation by the West." (p. 457).

"The great Chinese Empire of the Manchus, which, by the end of the eighteenth century, covered and dominated nearly half Asia, was now humbled and disgraced. Western Powers from distant Europe had defeated and humiliated it." (p. 465).

"It was extraordinary—this shameless scramble. Of course, China did not enjoy parting with territory or granting concessions. She was forced to agree, on every occasion, by displays of naval force and threats of bombardment. What shall we call this scandalous behaviour? Highway robbery? Brigandage? It is the way of imperialism. Sometimes it works in secret; sometimes it covers its evil deeds under a cloak of pious sentiment and hypocritical pretence of doing good to others. But in China in 1898 there was no cloak or covering. The naked thing stood out in all its ugliness." (p. 474).

After the departure of the imperialist British, India inherited the border fashioned by them. It is natural that the Chinese should wish to have it rectified. The only proper way to settle the border dispute, in the present world situation, is for India to accept the offer of the People's Republic of China and without any further loss of time to go to the negotiating table.

Since the actual fighting has ceased, India has had time to ponder over the failures of her policy of non-alignment. But Pandit Nehru has behaved about it in his characteristic way. When the situation for India was critical, he almost abandoned neutrality. But when he found an immediate and overwhelming response to his demand for arms from the West, he held back and tried to retrieve part of the lost ground.

The President of Ghana, the Head of an important neutral State, opposed military assistance to India on the ground that it would only serve to aggravate the situation. Objectively speaking, this was a correct stand. India, however, was in no frame of mind to accept an objective assessment. President Nkrumah, in a letter to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,

had stated that he was "distressed and saddened to hear the report that the British Government will give India every support in her fight against China". This reaction of a neutralist power caused consternation in India.

President Nkrumah's interpretation of the situation was an honest reflection of his neutralism. India's reaction would also have been the same if the dispute had been between two other states. In the existing case, however, India itself was on trial, not only as a neutralist country, but also as a State. For once, India directly had the experience of being sermonised by those not involved in the dispute.

Despite a major reverse in international diplomacy, Pandit Nehru regained sufficient composure to retrieve largely the ground he had lost in maintaining his superficial posture of neutrality. His principal aim in this effort was to maintain his country's friendly relations with the Soviet Union. It did not require any great feat of diplomacy to do so, because the Western donors of military assistance did not demand any drastic change of policy on his part as the price for such assistance. If he had abandoned neutrality, as was earlier indicated, he would have lost the support of the Soviet Union. The Soviet factor was the main motivation behind Pandit Nehru's attempt to maintain the facade of neutrality. At the same time, the Indian Government also tried desperately to foment misunderstanding between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. On 8th November 1962, Pandit Nehru said:

"Russia will continue to be friendly with us and not to do - anything injurious to us. I think that they do have friendly feelings for us."

As a corollary to this on 10th November, Nehru reasserted the policy of non-alignment and said that India would not give it up either out of fear or to oblige vested interests that were opposed to it.

Still, there is questioning among the Indian people about their Government's policy of non-alignment. This mood has been aggravated by the unwillingness of other neutral states to come forward effectively to support India. However, the Indian Prime Minister persists in maintaining the cover of neutrality for three reasons:

- (1) It has been demonstrated that the Western Powers are prepared to offer significant aid to India without preconditions;
- (2) It has been possible to maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union which is a vital factor in India's bargaining with the Western Powers; and
- (3) Nehru is reluctant to abandon at this stage of his career the policy to which he owes his international image.

Thus India finds itself isolated. It is appalled by that isolation and no less a person than the President of the Republic of India, Dr. Radhakrishnan, is reported to have said: "India, until recently, was living in a world of make-belief." Still Mr. Nehru has not forsaken his claim to neutralism. At the most, his brand of neutralism may now be said to incline towards the right rather than to the left.

One wonders if Mr. Nehru's foreign policy is undergoing a catharsis or a nemesis. If it is a catharsis, he may well achieve the greatest diplomatic triumph of his famous career. On the other hand, if it is a nemesis, Mr. Nehru will go down in history as a fallen idol. What it will eventually be does not lie entirely in India's control. It will depend very much on the attitude of the Western Powers.

The rush of arms to India contradicts the much publicised thesis of the Harvard intellectuals that in the present state of international affairs and development of military science, the supply to any country of military hardware is an obsolete form of assistance. According to this school of thought, all the emphasis should be placed on economic assistance. Much was made of this thesis during the last Presidential election campaign and

after the Kennedy administration came into office. Following this thesis, a qualitative shift was brought about by the liberal wing of the Democratic Party in the thinking of a section of the American intelligentsia. But hard facts of life and not theories alone have to be taken into account in formulating policies. The Kennedy administration has had to reassess the validity of the Harvard thesis in an actual crisis. The importance of military assistance has once again been recognised, and, even at the cost of betraying an ally like Pakistan, arms aid has been given to India.

As a consequence, India finds itself friendless and so does Pakistan. India, because she has remained neutral, and Pakistan, because she has been wedded to defence alliances. Never before has the wheel of history turned full circle with such vengeance.

Is it not a cruel irony that the two nations of the sub-continent, that have all these years followed diametrically opposite policies, are today so placed that alliance with the West is being advocated in India and neutralism has become the cry in Pakistan? This trend of thinking is the product of an extraordinary and abnormal denouement of events. But so far as we are concerned we cannot base our national policies on considerations arising from sudden developments. They must have a firm and rational foundation. On dispassionate reflection we should realise the danger inherent in an impetuous and precipitate break with the fundamentals of the policy that we have so far followed.

Is the problem so simple that by merely swapping friends we, that is, both India and Pakistan, will find ideal solutions to our respective problems? Can the Kashmir question be solved to our mutual satisfaction by trading horses? Is there not something radically wrong with the situation in which, after fifteen years of independence, both countries are experiencing a sense of disillusionment and frustration over basic aspects of policy, so much so that

today we should each like to be in the other's shoes? This curious situation is essentially due to the tension that exists between the two countries.

However, just as we ought to be more cautious in making new friends, our friends ought perhaps to be equally cautious in making new acquaintances. A bird in hand is worth two in the bush. Confidence is built over a period of time, and understanding comes with the maturing of relationships and not from considerations of passing expediency.

We have accused our friends of betraying us, the great let-down of contemporary international affairs. Friendship in inter-State relations is not a personal factor; it is entirely impersonal. The Soviet Union has often been admired for remaining steadfast to its friends. This reputation it has long possessed. I am, however, surprised that no one in the House has observed or made any mention of the present Cuban crisis and of how that valiant young revolutionary, Fidel Castro, was misled and let down by a great ally like the Soviet Union.

Cuba has been let down badly. The U.S.S.R. placed missiles in that little country, far from Soviet soil and gave Fidel Castro a false sense of security. When the chips were down, Mr. Khrushchev took away the missiles and sent Mr. Mikoyan instead!

We are passing through a very difficult period of our history. In the present critical situation, the difference between a right and false move might well mean the difference between survival and disaster for our nation.

This situation has been ably and courageously handled by our Foreign Minister, Mr. Mohammed Ali, not only here but also in the United Nations. I wish to pay him a tribute for the manner in which he has performed his difficult task. It has indeed been extremely difficult and I, for one, would not wish to change places with him for all the camels in Sind.

The united will of a people is the most powerful weapon in its armoury. That will is tested in crises and it is in a crisis that a nation rises or falls. I have no doubt that we shall be able to stand the test whenever it comes. This nation of a hundred million will respond to the call of duty with all its vigour and vitality. In the name of the people of Pakistan and in the name of the people of Sind, whom I represent in the Government of Pakistan, let me make it clear to the whole world that in the defence of our country we shall, when the occasion demands, be prepared to make every sacrifice, and even lay down our lives. Rejecting the obnoxious colonial categories of martial and non-martial races, I say that if we have to fight for the preservation of the independence of Pakistan, every Pakistani, man and woman will be a soldier. The whole nation will be in arms. If we fight with an indomitable spirit and tenacity, victory will be ours.

If we persevere with the same firmness and strength of purpose we shall also be able to liberate Kashmir. The nation, I have no doubt, will rally round its flag and its leader. It will protect our ramparts. If need be, it will move mountains.

The Government of Pakistan appeals to the Government of India to accept the generous offer of the Central Government of the People's Republic of China to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the border conflict. It is incumbent on the parties concerned and on the United Nations, as the arbiter of world peace, to make earnest efforts to settle the Sino-Indian dispute, or else, a blind fate may drive those nations towards self-destruction.

It is for the great men who control the destinies of their peoples, to settle this dispute and all other important disputes according to the principles of justice and equity, so that the people of the world can be enabled to make the fullest use of this age of glorious opportunities.

III

Joint Communique signed by President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Nehru on 29th November 1962 (1st December 1962)

I seek your permission to make a short statement on the Joint Communique signed by Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, and Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, on the evening of 29th November 1962, which you, Sir, and Members of the House must have read in yesterday's morning newspapers.

In the recent past, events have moved so dramatically and swiftly, that, at times, it has not been possible to keep pace with them. We are deeply concerned about the recent developments as they affect our relations not only with our neighbours but also with other countries with whom we have close association.

The National Assembly has been convened because of the situation that had arisen out of the Sino-Indian conflict. A crisis was precipitated on our borders and the country was gravely affected by it. It was felt necessary to take into confidence the Members of this Assembly, who are the chosen representatives of the people of Pakistan.

We have had a useful and constructive discussion in the House and the Government has benefited by the different views expressed by its Members. We are happy that we have been able to gauge the sentiments prevailing in the country with regard to the question of Kashmir and its early, honourable and equitable solution.

On our part we have tried to keep the House informed of all the developments, as far as the canons of administrative and diplomatic propriety would permit. But events have moved so fast that it has not been physically possible to keep everyone fully informed of them. Nevertheless,

our desire has been to keep in close touch with the responsible representatives of the people and, in particular, with the leaders of the various groups.

Sir, so far as this Communique is concerned, it was issued after 7.00 p.m. on 29th November. It was the intention of the Government to give the background of this Communique to the House yesterday morning. But, in consultation with the leaders of the various groups, it was agreed, and that was the consensus of opinion, that as the Communique was a very important document, the party leaders needed time to consider it and its implications. You, therefore, adjourned yesterday's sitting to meet again today.

As I have said, because of the rapid march of events, it was not possible to keep the House informed of successive developments. It is known to everyone that when discussions are at a critical or sensitive stage, it is not possible for the Government to reveal every aspect of those discussions. In India, in spite of the existence of a state of emergency and the fact that the Lok Sabha was in session, the Indian Government did not take it into confidence on the contents of the Joint Communique. In such cases, a good deal has to be left unsaid. I hope the House will be satisfied with this explanation. It is the genuine desire of the Government to take the nation into confidence and precisely for this reason the National Assembly has been summoned for this emergency session. We intend to continue to do that through this House so far as that is possible and permissible.

Now, I shall read out the Communique to the House. With your permission, I shall read its text:

"The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India have agreed that a renewed effort should be made to resolve the outstanding differences between their two countries on Kashmir and other related matters so as to enable India and Pakistan to live side by side in peace and1 friendship. In consequence, they have decided to start discussions at an early date with the

object of reaching an honourable and equitable settlement. These will be held in the initial stage at the Ministerial level. At the appropriate stage, direct talks will be held between Mr. Nehru and President Ayub.

S d/ - MOHAMMAD AYUB KHAN
29-11-1962

S d/ - JAWAHARLAL NEHRU
29-11-1962."

This Communique was issued simultaneously in Rawalpindi and New Delhi.

After its release, certain developments took place which have somewhat confused the picture. It is reported that the Prime Minister of India, in his statement in the Lok Sabha, tried to modify, or qualify, the undertaking given by him in the Communique. I am sure the House has read that statement. I must admit that it caused an electrifying reaction in Pakistan, not only in the Government but in the entire nation. The representatives of the countries that have tried to bring us a little closer to a settlement of our dispute and who were present in Pakistan also reacted rather sharply to this pronouncement of the Prime Minister of India. This is reflected in the statement made by Mr. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State of the United States and Special Emissary of President Kennedy to India and Pakistan. Mr. Harriman, on reading Mr. Nehru's statement, commented immediately as follows on the night of 30th November:

"Prime Minister Nehru made it quite clear to Mr. Duncan Sandys and to me that he was prepared to enter into discussions to resolve the differences between India and Pakistan on Kashmir without pre-conditions. I feel sure he intends to carry out this undertaking."

The High Commission for the United Kingdom also issued a statement last night. It says:

"On arrival at Karachi at 10 o'clock tonight, 30th November, Mr. Duncan Sandys was shown a report of the statement made in the Lok Sabha by Mr. Nehru this morning. In view of the grave reaction to the statement in Pakistan, Mr. Sandys has decided to fly to Delhi immediately, in order to clear up the misunderstanding which, if allowed to persist, might seriously prejudice the coming discussions between India and Pakistan."

As this statement indicates, although Mr. Duncan Sandys, Secretary for Commonwealth Relations in the Government of the United Kingdom, was to leave for London, he changed his schedule and flew back to New Delhi. Arriving there in the early hours of this morning, he issued a statement which has not yet been reported in our Press. I would like to draw the attention of the House, to this statement which was released in New Delhi during the night of 30th November/1st December, 1962. It says:

"When I arrived in Karachi this evening on my way back to London, I was shown a report of a statement made by Mr. Nehru in the Indian Parliament about the forthcoming talks between India and Pakistan. At the same time, I was informed of the grave concern which his statement had evoked in Pakistan. Since I was sure that this had arisen from a misunderstanding, I thought it right to fly at once to Delhi and see Mr. Nehru in order to clear the matter up. As I expected, Mr. Nehru readily assured me that it was incorrect to read into his statement any intention to limit the scope of the discussions or to exclude consideration of any solution which either government might wish to propose."

This morning, it has been reported that after Mr. Duncan Sandys' discussion with the Indian Prime Minister, another statement has been issued, which reads as follows:

"Mr. Nehru, when asked to comment on the statement made by Mr. Harriman and Mr. Sandys, said:

'These statements correctly represent the position of the Government of India. There has never been any question of pre-conditions on the scope of the talks which the two Governments are initiating. As I indicated yesterday in the Lok Sabha, the problem of Kashmir is complicated and difficult; but I am sure that with goodwill on both sides, it should be possible to work out an honourable and equitable solution of this and other problems'."

This is the statement which is reported to have been issued this morning by the Indian Prime Minister.

Now, Sir, what is important is the fact that the Indian Prime Minister has put his signature on a Communique, which is now a public document for the whole world to see and read, in which he has agreed to discuss the Kashmir problem and to arrive at an honourable and equitable solution of it. That is what is important. That is the crux of the whole transaction. I do not have to explain here that very often when a fixed policy changes, the change is usually not admitted at once. Public opinion has to be considered. We know how strong the feelings are in both countries on this question. I therefore beseech the House through you, Sir, to understand the difficulties of the situation, and not to read too much into what was said by Mr. Nehru in the Lok Sabha.

Sir, in the past we have been trapped, to use a word which may not be very sophisticated but which conveys our meaning. We have also been misled in the past. We are an aggrieved party, an injured party and we are moving with the utmost caution. We should not read more into the situation than it warrants; nor should we like the nation to do so. In good faith, we tried in the past to negotiate a settlement of the Kashmir dispute; but in vain. Now

there has been a certain chain of events, a certain combination of events, which has brought about a radical change in the situation, and once that change has taken place, people have to take cognizance of it, because there is no force, and there is no argument, which is stronger than the compulsion of events. Let us, therefore, be patient and cautious, but let us, at the same time, be determined to approach the problem in a realistic manner.

On account of our cautiousness, it has been decided that the Summit Conference between the Prime Minister of India and our President is to be preceded by Ministerial discussions and negotiations. This is, in itself, an indication that we are not trying to rush things. The very fact that our Government has proposed, and the Government of India has agreed, that Ministerial discussions should first take place, so that the thinking of the two parties is crystallised so as to lead at least to some tentative formula and thus provide a concrete basis for negotiation, is a proof of our cautiousness. Unless we are convinced of the fact that there is a change of heart and a sincere approach on the part of India, the Summit Conference will not take place.

Now, Sir, I should again like to assure the House that the developments which have culminated in the Joint Communique do not in any way prejudice or jeopardise our relations with any other state. What India and Pakistan have agreed to is to negotiate a peaceful settlement of their outstanding disputes. This is exactly what the People's Republic of- China has proposed to India.

I am very thankful to you Sir, for having given me this opportunity to address the House.

IV

Sino-Indian Conflict — Western Arms for India — Pacts with the West — Negotiations with India — Relations with China and USSR, (4th December 1962)

This emergency session of the National Assembly of Pakistan was called when the alarming events that have been taking place in our region had reached a critical stage. In calling this session the intention of the Government was to ascertain the views of the representatives of the nation coming from different parts of the country and belonging to different parties.

We have heard with great profit the constructive suggestions that have been made in the course of the debate. We have always been aware of the strong feelings that exist in the country on the question of Kashmir which we regard as the question of questions for Pakistan. We have taken note of the views expressed on the massive arms aid which has come to India as a result of the Sino-Indian border conflict.

As I said in my speech on 26th November, foreign policy is the hallmark of the sovereignty of a nation, a manifestation of its independence. It is indeed the most important and the most sensitive aspect of a country's policy. Foreign policy cannot be subjected to mob rule. It cannot be subjected to the clamour of the street. In formulating foreign policy, the Government has to take into consideration not only the immediate interests of the country but also its long-term interests. Moreover, the Government alone is in possession of all the facts about the developments that are taking place, about the currents and under-currents of international opinion and the changes that are taking place in it. All these are matters that have to be carefully considered in the formulation of the country's foreign policy. In this twentieth century, events move so fast that even in normal times—let alone abnormal times—it is not always possible to take all the honourable members into confidence. This fact is axiomatic. I do not have to dilate on it. Its validity has been appreciated by the House. At a critical juncture, such as the present one, a

decision one way or the other, may make or mar the destiny of our people and our country. Those saddled with responsibility have constantly to bear that in mind.

The National Assembly of Pakistan, having been convened to meet in an emergency session, I would like to assure honourable members that Government has taken them into confidence so far as has been possible and so far as has been necessary. We appreciate their response which, on the whole, has been an understanding and accommodating one.

A serious situation has developed around the sub-continent. It was more serious a few weeks ago than it is today; but the crisis is still with us. Its lingering clouds still cast dark shadows over our horizon. However, at the time when the session was convened, we could not foresee certain developments that have since taken place. We could not, for instance, anticipate the unilateral declaration of a cease-fire by the People's Republic of China, motivated by the highest considerations of peace and goodwill and of the security not only of this area but of the whole world. Nor could we have anticipated certain other events which have logically followed from that cease-fire.

At the time when the conflict on the Chinese border arose, the Government of Pakistan made its own position with regard to it quite clear. We were convinced that the conflict was no more than border warfare, that the war was at best a phantom war and that the only question involved in it was that of the rectification of a boundary which, even Indian leaders some years ago admitted, had been imposed on the People's Republic of China. Sir, the stand taken by the Government of Pakistan has been vindicated by the unilateral declaration of a cease-fire by the People's Republic of China and by the offer of peace made by the Chinese Prime Minister to the Prime Minister of India.

We have done everything in our power to exercise restraint. We have cautioned other countries also to move in the matter in a guarded fashion in order to obviate the recurrence of hostilities and prevent an enlargement of the conflict. But notwithstanding our counsel of caution, certain countries, for reasons of their own, have thought it fit to make a voluntary gift of massive arms to India in order to enable it to carry on the war with the People's Republic of China.

This arms aid given to India by certain Western countries has alarmed us. It is a matter which perturbs the people of Pakistan. If this supply of arms to India is to continue on the present scale, it is bound to aggravate the Sino-Indian dispute and perhaps lead to a more serious situation, escalating into nuclear annihilation. We have the satisfaction that, for our part, we have more than cautioned the Western countries. In their own global interests, these countries have taken a stand and offered arms assistance to India despite our protests. India is unfortunately trying to take advantage of the situation to obtain arms on a massive scale without regard to the dangerous consequences that will ensue from it. These consequences will be dangerous not only for India but also to the whole of this region. By opening its gates, so to speak, to arms from the United States of America and Great Britain, India is undoubtedly aggravating the situation between itself and the People's Republic of China.

We have been told that India intends to augment its armed forces by no less than 40 per cent of their present strength. Let any objective, impartial observer judge and decide whether such an augmentation is commensurate with India's economic resources, her Political viability and her actual defence requirements. To expect India to be able to sustain a force of that size is completely unrealistic. India's attempt to do so will bring about complications not only in India's relations with China but also in her relations with Pakistan and even with the other neighbouring countries.

We are told that this arms assistance is required by India to drive back the Chinese. This is another dangerous thesis. If India attempts to drive back the Chinese in the terrain where the recent conflict took place, where communications are poor in the extreme, that will lead to a situation which will pose a very grave and serious threat to the sub-continent and to Asia as a whole.

In the twentieth century there is no question of thinking in terms of driving any one back by force. With the threat of nuclear annihilation ever present in the minds of all sensible people, there is only one proper course of action and that is the resolution of conflicts by peaceful negotiations. Salvation lies in being guided by civilised methods under the umbrella of international law, not by the promptings of impulse or pride or the passions of a newly sovereign people. An attempt by India to drive back the Chinese will lead not only to a full scale conflict between the two sides but also perhaps to a much larger conflict.

We want not only the people of India but also the Western Powers, who, by acting impetuously and playing into India's hands, have failed to recognise the folly of a course of action which might inflict enormous sufferings on the inhabitants of the sub-continent and of the rest of Asia. By now, India should have learnt that it is suicidal to think in terms of an armed conflict with a major Power like the People's Republic of China.

The People's Republic of China is no pimple on the face of India as was little Goa. It is a Colossus. It is a vast indestructible country of 650 million people, united in a common cause and with common ideals for the sake of which they would willingly lay down their lives. It is in the interests of the people of India, of the peoples of the sub-continent and the peoples of our entire region that India should accept the offer made by the Chinese Prime Minister and go to the negotiating table so that this dispute can be resolved in a manner satisfactory both to China and India.

The real purpose of India wanting to augment its forces recklessly is to build up an army for two fronts, to face the People's Republic of China and to face Pakistan. That is the real purpose of India's request for massive aid. It is for this purpose that India is making a desperate bid to build up its armed forces. We cannot accept this situation with equanimity. That the people of Pakistan are concerned about it has been shown both in this House as well as outside it. I should like to reiterate and re-emphasise to the Western democracies that they should not rush into this dangerous venture, for who knows it might trigger a world war of nuclear annihilation.

What is required is not only peace between China and India but also disengagement of forces between India and Pakistan. This disengagement can only be brought about if the explosive question of Kashmir is settled on an honourable and equitable basis. As far as Pakistan is concerned, we have always said that we were willing to have such a settlement of this issue.

Now, the recent events, dramatic and critical as they have been, have led to the release of a Joint Communique by the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan. This Communique has been the subject of considerable debate in the House. A few days ago, I made a statement with regard to it. I should like to say that we all know that the problem of Kashmir is a tangled one and in it are involved the prestige and the passions of the two nations of this sub-continent. But to solve this complex problem, which has defied solution during the last fifteen painful years, we need to separate passion from policy and pride from the pursuit of a solution. The Joint Communique breaks the agonising stalemate.

It has been said that the Joint Communique was actually a conspiracy, of which we have been the victim; that what India wants is to gain time; that India is not anxious to settle the problem; that India considers her occupation of Kashmir as a settled fact; and that constitutionally and

politically it regards Kashmir to be an integral and inseparable part of India. All these arguments have been advanced on the floor of the House. If one were to accept them, it would follow that the Joint Communique is actually a deception and a fraud and that we should not have agreed to it. Actually these arguments demonstrate the value of the Joint Communique, for the Communique marks a manifest departure from the position that Kashmir is a dead issue and establishes that it is a live issue and that it is recognised to be such by the Prime Minister of India, after fifteen years of denial of it by him.

Now, let us be realistic. We know that this problem has been frozen or attempts have been made to freeze it. Let us also admit that in regard to it positions have hardened in both countries. The Joint Communique has at least changed that situation. In that sense, we have moved forward.

As I said the other day, when a departure takes place from hardened positions, we have to be a little patient and in all fairness we have to create a new climate, such as will generate goodwill on both sides. Without that, however strong the compulsion of events, or the force of circumstances or other good reasons for it, there can be no genuine attempt at negotiation. Therefore, before we enter into the talks and begin negotiations, we have to assume that there is a goodwill and a desire on the part of the other side to settle this problem.

If, on the other hand, we are sceptical and begin with a defeatist attitude, then nothing is going to happen. There will not be a single step forward. If there is to be no step forward, I am afraid, no government will be able to settle this problem.

We are not capable of any miracles. However, we are as patriotic as the Opposition. A mere line divides us from them in this House. It is not true or fair to say that we are devoid of patriotism; that we do not feel as strongly

on this issue as they do. As I have said, there is only a line dividing them from us; and that dividing line does not give them a monopoly of patriotism, nor are they the exclusive repository of all the wisdom in the land. They are a minority with a majority complex. They should realise that we are as anxious and determined as they are to see an end to the problem of Kashmir.

We are happy that the agonising stalemate is broken and that some progress has been achieved. It may be that disillusionment awaits us. I admit that we have been disillusioned in the past. Every school boy in Pakistan knows how generous we have been, how much confidence we have reposed in our adversaries and how on each occasion we were deceived. We know this but I think that with that experience, and notwithstanding the bitterness of the past, we shall be in a better position to enter into these talks. Besides, by entering into them, we are giving away nothing. On the contrary, we are gaining something.

Now, I return to the Joint Communiqué. It states: "The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India have agreed that a renewed effort should be made to resolve the outstanding differences between their two countries on Kashmir and other related matters." The words "related matters" are particularly important. I do not want to go into details, as that might affect the atmosphere we are trying to create, a better atmosphere, shorn of the hatred and bitterness of the past. I would, therefore, not like to go into an explanation of "other related matters". But do consider the significance of these words. When the Opposition demands that we should have made this or that condition, they should take into consideration the words "other related matters".

There is some contradiction in the approach of the members of the Opposition. On the one hand, their demand is: Fix a time-table and set a time-limit so that India does not procrastinate or get time to consolidate its

position further in Kashmir. On the other hand, instead of "other related matters", they have suggested a catalogue of "other matters", to discuss which an inordinate amount of time would be required. The other matters they have suggested are no doubt important but, in the context of Kashmir, they are relatively not such. The members of the Opposition demand a speedy conclusion of the Kashmir negotiations, and yet they put forward a catalogue of other issues and say these too should be the subject of discussion. Sir, they approbation and reprobate with astonishing inconsistency and speed.

I submit for the consideration of this House and for the consideration of the people of Pakistan that we should not take a negative attitude. Our efforts should not be counter-productive. We lose nothing by welcoming this latest development of events. We do not endanger our relations with other countries, to which matter I shall later revert. As a point of departure from our old relations with India, we should welcome the present development.

It has also been said by the members of the Opposition that we cannot barter away the interests and wishes of the people of Kashmir, that the people of Kashmir should not only have been consulted but should also have taken part in the negotiations. I appeal to their good sense and ask how such an arrangement could have been constitutionally possible. The very fact that it is the question of Kashmir, which I have called "the question of questions for Pakistan", which comes in the way of normal and friendly relations between Pakistan and India, shows how deep and lasting is our concern for the people of Kashmir. We cannot talk of Kashmir in the abstract. The very fact that we demand a solution in Kashmir means that we are taking into consideration the legitimate aspirations and sufferings of the great and heroic people of Kashmir.

It has also been said that these negotiations should not be entered into because that somehow or the other bypasses the United Nations or weakens

our position in the United Nations. This is an argument which I cannot understand.

I should like to refer you to an Article of the United Nations Charter, namely Article 33, Chapter VI, which states:

"1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

"2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means." Now, if one were to go through the important resolutions of the United Nations and the recommendations of its representatives, it would be found that time and again it was suggested that the parties to the dispute, i.e., Pakistan and India, should resort to "negotiations". This was the recommendation of Dr. Frank Graham and of others who dealt with the Kashmir problem.

Let us leave aside the much maligned Western democracies, who have always lent their complete support to us in the Security Council. Let us leave them aside for the moment. Even the Soviet Union has suggested to Pakistan and India that the best way to solve the Kashmir problem is by entering into negotiations. Such bilateral negotiations have been suggested not only by the Soviet Union, but by all other important Communist countries. They have been suggested by neutralist countries as well. When I went to Cairo, just before the last Security Council meeting on Kashmir, President Gamal Nasser told me that the best way to solve the Kashmir dispute was first of all to exhaust all the possibilities of bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan. The same suggestion was made by Ghana and Ireland, and by several other members of the United Nations.

Therefore, by entering into negotiations, we are in no way jeopardising our position in the United Nations; we are in no way departing from our stand in the United Nations. We are not compromising or prejudicing our position in that world forum. If at any time the negotiations should become infructuous, we would be free to go to the United Nations, and to go to that Organisation with our hands strengthened. We could then tell the United Nations that we had more than exhausted the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter. I repeat that the present developments strengthen our position in the United Nations rather than weaken it.

I have always been a great believer in the United Nations, and I still believe that it has come to play an important and decisive role as an instrument of peace in the world. We, the peoples of the smaller countries, in particular, must see to it that the United Nations is strengthened. Pakistan's policy has always been to lend complete support to all United Nations resolutions and to strengthen the United Nations and all its organs. But in regard to the Kashmir problem, there is a contradiction in our approach to the United Nations. When we go to the United Nations, there is cynicism. We are asked: What will the United Nations do? What has the United Nations done? Why repose confidence in it? How long are you going to keep this problem shelved by taking it to the United Nations? Thus, when Government activates the problem in the United Nations, there is a feeling of frustration in the country. People think that the United Nations is subject to big Power pressure and because of the veto, nothing fruitful will emerge from it. That is the attitude when we go to the United Nations.

When we agree to bilateral talks, we are told with brazen inconsistency that, the Security Council being seized with the case, the talks will jeopardise our position in the United Nations. What then should the Government do? I should also like to submit that when, after a discussion in the Security Council, the veto has been applied, the sequel must necessarily be a dialogue

between the parties. When the two parties disagree, the veto thwarts all positive approaches. Some countries support India, others support Pakistan. Any resolution that is tabled is subject to the veto. If the veto rules out mediation or arbitration, we have no option but to exhaust the procedure of bilateral talks.

We have been reminded of the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, namely those of 13th August, 1948, and 5th January, 1949, respectively. These resolutions are there. They call for a plebiscite preceded by demilitarisation. We have had debates for a number of years on the question of the implementation of these resolutions. When any proposal is made to facilitate their implementation, it becomes subject to the veto.

Although negotiation is the only proper course at a certain stage, and in a certain phase of a dispute, yet we find that it has become suspect. It is felt that it is dangerous. What is really unusual about our willingness to talk? Even the United States and the U.S.S.R., in spite of the United Nations and in spite of so many other avenues of getting together, have had, on a number of important occasions, direct negotiations, the most recent ones being when President Kennedy, after his election, met Premier Khrushchev in Vienna. Nobody expected that all the problems of the world would be solved through them, that there would be complete and general disarmament, that the question of Berlin would be settled and that the Soviet Union and the United States of America would begin to live in eternal comradeship. Nobody expected such results. But that did not preclude the two Heads of States from meeting.

No responsible government should be prevented from making efforts to narrow down its differences with other governments. By negotiation one does not lose anything. Direct action today might lead to a complete destruction of our cities, our homes and mosques. We must not put our country into

jeopardy. I have confidence in the people of Pakistan, and I know that they are capable of the greatest courage and of the greatest sacrifices. But we should not be told by future generations that we were irresponsible, that we unnecessarily led the country into the kind of action which a Chinghiz Khan might take. That would be the result of direct action!

It has been said that there should have been pre-conditions to the negotiations. Why should there be pre-conditions. Our case is known to the whole world, and is known in every home, in every village and town in Pakistan. We have repeatedly and solemnly stated it. Our case is known to the other side, as theirs is known to us. We are entering into negotiations with our case fully explained and known to the whole world.

What is the meaning of a dispute? What is the definition of a dispute? In a dispute there is a claim and a counter-claim. When you enter into negotiations for the settlement of a dispute, your claim is known to the other side and the claim of the other side is known to you. Thus the parties know what the subject of negotiation is. There can, therefore, be no question of pre-conditions.

I would not like to say any more about the Joint Communique. We are going through a difficult and perilous period. In the crucial days ahead we should speak with a united voice. Our endeavour should be to create an atmosphere of goodwill and understanding such as will be conducive to a settlement. We shall enter into the negotiations with full knowledge of our past experience. What is the object of the Ministerial level meeting in the first instance? If we come to know that there is on the other side no goodwill and no intention to tackle the problem in a realistic manner and to find an equitable and honourable solution of it, then the Summit Conference will, I think, be unnecessary. In the meantime, our vigilance has to be maintained and we should be prepared for all eventualities.

In the past, although the odds have been against us, India being the larger country, with greater resources, we have, nevertheless, shown that we have the capability and the courage to meet eventualities, which might endanger our national life and security. When I say that we should maintain our vigilance, I mean vigilance over every part of Pakistan. The territory of East Pakistan is as sacred to us as that of West Pakistan. There can be no real defence of Pakistan without proper safeguard of the frontiers of East Pakistan. The defence of East Pakistan is, in a sense, even more vital than that of West Pakistan. The defence forces of East Pakistan are to be augmented and strengthened especially in the light of the present developments. I should like to inform the House that a new reoriented look is being given to the problems of East Pakistan and its defence requirements.

The Government understands the disappointment of the House and of the people of Pakistan in regard to our membership of the defence Pacts. We had thought that the Pacts would serve a useful purpose. But in the cold ruthlessness of international politics, we cannot expect a perfect alliance or a state of relations which would be ideal from our point of view alone. Such an expectation would be divorced from reality. Nevertheless, I recognize that we have been disappointed by the half-hearted and sometimes lukewarm support we have received from those who are members of the defence alliances with which we are associated and from whom we expected substantial support in our difficulties.

I must state here that we shall not hesitate for a moment to withdraw from these Pacts, if and when Pakistan's interests so demand. We entered into them to promote the interests of Pakistan and its people. If those interests are not promoted, if they are not safeguarded by the Pacts, then let it be known that we shall withdraw from them and adopt a policy which will promote and safeguard the highest interests of the people of Pakistan and its security.

The criticism to which the Pacts have been subjected in this debate reminds me of the reply which Socrates gave to one of his pupils, who had reported to him that a certain individual had been abusing the philosopher. Socrates said that he could not believe it and added: "It is impossible that the person you mention should abuse me. I have done him no favour. I have never obliged him. Why should he find fault with me?" The Pacts are there. We are critical of them.

The fact is that as defensive arrangements they have not been altogether without value to us. They have had their meaning in the larger context of things and they have served their purpose. In the present circumstances, in the present denouement of events, let me tell the people of Pakistan and their leaders that we cannot permit ourselves to lapse into the coma of isolation. It was in such state of isolation that we became the victim of aggression-aggression which snatched away Junagadh, Manavadar and Kashmir from us.

I should like to make it clear beyond all doubt that we have friendly relations with the People's Republic of China and that nothing will be permitted in any way to endanger those relations. Our relations with China are an independent factor in our foreign policy and not contingent on any other. This has been made clear to the House. We shall see to it that, as events unfold, our point of view and our position are explained to and understood by the Chinese Government. That is our duty and we shall discharge it. In the best interests of Pakistan, we shall maintain the spirit of goodwill, friendship and cordiality with the great People's Republic of China.

Similarly, it will be our endeavour to maintain good relations also with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. The present Government and the predecessor Government achieved some degree of normalization of relations with the Soviet Union by entering into an oil agreement with that country. We shall welcome further co-operation with it in the economic and other

beneficial fields, co-operation which may be of mutual interest to the Soviet Union and to Pakistan

In conclusion, I would say again that the Government has benefited greatly from the discussion that has taken place in this House. We have taken into consideration the views expressed by its members, representing various shades of opinion. For our part we have, as far as possible, taken them into confidence in respect of all developments.

I shall be expressing the sentiment shared by all sections of this House when I say that after the dust of this debate has settled down, it will be found that we stand united on many matters. We do believe that India and the People's Republic of China should settle their conflict in a peaceful manner. This is the only honourable way in which they can come to terms. India should accept the offer of negotiations made by the Prime Minister of China. We believe that Pakistan's friendship with China is a growing factor in our foreign policy and that it does not depend on any other factor. We believe in the normalization of relations with the Soviet Union and with other states, in particular with the Muslim countries, and not excluding the neutral countries. With many of these countries, we have a host of affinities. We are thankful to Turkey and other countries which have taken up a constructive attitude in the present Sino-Indian conflict.

We feel that the Western Powers have disappointed us. We have cause to feel this disappointment because we are gravely concerned about the rush of arms to India. Nevertheless, we assure them that our relations with them will remain steadfast, provided they appreciate Pakistan's position and recognise its point of view that the arms assistance to India must inevitably pose a very serious threat to the entire sub-continent.

Finally, we believe that nothing will be lost if we promptly enter into negotiations with India. We should, of course, be very cautious and should

bear in mind the difficulties that we have encountered in the past negotiations. Let us make this last attempt. It will enable us to find out whether there has been any growth of goodwill for us in India and whether circumstances have led it to realise that good relations are in the best interest of both our countries.

These negotiations will, in no way, prejudice or jeopardise our stand in the United Nations. On these issues, I think, there can be no difference of opinion amongst us. It is not a question of the personal satisfaction of individuals. It is the question of the future of Pakistan. It is the question of the future of our people.

Pakistan was created by a great man. To preserve it, we shall make every sacrifice in the way in which Pakistanis are known to make sacrifices. I appeal to all to speak with one voice and tell the world that Pakistan stands united and will not surrender on any vital issue. I pledge my word that we shall persevere in the cause of Kashmir, and shall never abandon it. We want a peaceful settlement of all disputes. We shall stand by this principle.

V

Reappraisal of Foreign Policy — Western Arms for India — Negotiations with India on Kashmir—Boundary Agreement with China (17th July 1963)

This nation, born in the midst of crisis has, during the last fifteen years of its existence, witnessed many emergencies. But I submit that the emergency through which it is now passing is, perhaps, the gravest it has had to face.

Our foreign policy is being subjected today to rethinking and reappraisal. This is because of certain internal developments in the political life of the country and certain external developments set in motion by some major decisions of the big Powers in relation to the sub-continent.

During the past years, there have been occasions when there was a demand for the reformulation of our foreign policy. As is well known, some political parties and schools of political thought in Pakistan were not reconciled to the foreign policy that had been adopted for the country. However, on those occasions the compulsive force of the developments of which I have spoken was absent and consequently no change of policy took place. Today, we are confronted with not only the arguments of the dissenters for a revision of our foreign policy, reinforced by our experience of the past decade/but also the impact of the events of the last few months. We are thus compelled to reconsider Pakistan's basic position in international affairs.

The searching re-examination through which we are going might well lead to a metamorphosis in our national life. For that reason. I would urge the House to be good enough to concede the Government's request to limit the discussion to the fundamentals of our foreign policy and not to go into the details of its various problems. These problems are at present being identified and reappraised by the Government. Only last November, we had in this House a long and exhaustive debate on external affairs, when every aspect of them was discussed. In the Dacca session, the House had yet

another opportunity of debating our foreign relations. The present position is but a continuation of the emergency that arose last October. The events that have since taken place are a logical sequel of the crisis which was precipitated in the sub-continent by the Sino-Indian conflict and the decision of the Western Powers to extend massive military aid to India. Thus, the situation which we are facing today is basically the same as that which we faced in October and November, 1962. Moreover, all the events which have since taken place are known to the House. The emergency which existed at that time was debated in a secret session. The House had also the opportunity of hearing the President of Pakistan. In consequence, the members of the Assembly are sufficiently well informed on the thinking of the Government and the Government is similarly informed on the thinking of the country. Nor is there any need to repeat all the arguments that can be presented in favour of or against the foreign policy of Pakistan.

As I said in my opening remarks, the present threat to the national security and territorial integrity of Pakistan is by no means the first one in its experience. We have had to face crisis after crisis from the very day that our country came into existence, all because of India's unfortunate antagonism. The fact that India has been enabled by the Western Powers to augment its military strength to a most formidable extent has made the situation even more disturbing and dangerous. This augmentation is being brought about through the assistance principally of the United States of America and the United Kingdom, with both of whom we are associated in defence alliances. This is the new element which has been injected into the situation and which aggravates it.

During the last fifteen years, India has embarked on a course of aggression on no less than five occasions. This indeed is a record which any aggressor state, in the history of the world, might well envy. On a number of occasions, the Prime Minister of India, his cabinet colleagues, the Ministers of provincial governments in India and the leaders of political parties in that country have

made statements naming Pakistan as India's Enemy Number One. This declaration of enmity was repeated even during the Sino-Indian fighting by officials and other responsible spokesmen of the Government of India. Such is the position which India has taken up in relation to Pakistan.

However, notwithstanding the professions of peaceful intent and of pacific policies by India, in actual fact, India is an aggressor state. Therefore, when India is arming itself feverishly, as she is at present, we cannot look upon it with equanimity. The situation which has thus been created is a grave one. It poses for us a threat, to counter which we need all our resources and strength.

This situation is not of our making. On the contrary, we have been doing everything in our power to prevent the developments that have led to it. However, it was beyond our capacity to prevent them. In the Sino-Indian conflict are involved the two largest states of the East. We can do little to influence the course of the conflict between them, much less to bring about its termination.

We have told the Western Powers repeatedly that the augmentation of India's military strength is directed principally against Pakistan, to whose separate existence as a nation India has not really reconciled itself. We have adduced proof of this fact by inviting attention to India's past conduct as an aggressor state and to the utterances of responsible Indian leaders, betraying their aggressive intentions towards our country. We have reminded the Western Powers of the fact that the history of the sub-continent over a period of more than eight hundred years is the history of conflict between its two major communities. That conflict which at times took the form of war has continued after the partition. The Kashmir dispute has magnified it and aggravated the mutual suspicions and fears which bedevil relations between Pakistan and India.

Unfortunately, we and the Western Powers proceed on different basic assumptions. Their assumption is that, in the twentieth century, a state like India cannot embark on aggression against Pakistan and that the United Nations is there to prevent aggression and to cope with warlike crises anywhere in the world. The Western Powers also claim that they themselves can control the use of the arms given by them to India, so that they are not used against Pakistan. Further they have given us an assurance to the effect that if India embarks on aggression against us, they will come to our assistance. They consider that the Government and the people of Pakistan should be satisfied with this assurance as a guarantee of this country's security and independence.

We think otherwise. In the first place, history gives abundant proof of the fact that in any given situation it is difficult to determine who the aggressor is. It will be even more difficult now if modern weapons are used. It will not be possible to prove which party committed the first act that is to be classed as aggression, which party was the first to fire the shot and whether the first shot was fired in aggression or in self-defence. The United Nations, and the International Law Commission and, before them, the League of Nations, were seized with the problem of defining aggression. But no definition of it has yet been found. There is nothing more important for a sovereign state than actually to prevent aggression against itself, for after one's homes and cities have been destroyed, there is not much that can be done about it. The augmentation of India's military strength through the United States and the United Kingdom aid has given rise to a situation in which the threat to our security is being menacingly intensified and compounded.

Furthermore, India is in a position to sell its own products for money and with that money to purchase armaments from countries other than the United States and the United Kingdom. This in itself is a cause of alarm for Pakistan. And, of course, there are India's own resources of arms and the substantial military assistance it is receiving from the Soviet Union. It is poor

consolation to be told that if aggression is committed against Pakistan by India, the United States will come to Pakistan's assistance. But after aggression has taken place, with its concomitant loss of life and destruction of property, that will be meaningless.

The same assurance was given to India when the United States embarked on an arms aid programme to Pakistan. It might be recalled that at that time, the boot was on India's leg, and India had put forward the same arguments to discount the assurance that the United States would come to its assistance if it were attacked by Pakistan. But the assurance given to Pakistan is different in one sense. This difference arises from the fact that Pakistan is in every respect a far smaller country than India. Even if we make every possible sacrifice, with our resources and with the aid that we might get, we would still not be able to match India's resources or India's intrinsic strength. The best we could do would be to try and maintain some sort of a precarious balance. The reason is that India has over four times of Pakistan's population, territory, economic wealth and technical skill. Therefore, while the assurance given to India by the United States was quite superfluous that given to Pakistan is of little or no value in a situation in which our security is in jeopardy.

This point of view, which represents our genuine apprehension, has been made fully known both to the United States and the United Kingdom. They, however, feel that their global interests and policies require the containment of international Communism. They argue that these same considerations formed the basis of Western economic and military assistance to Pakistan. In view of their global policy and their belief that there is a real threat to India? they regard it as necessary for them to give military assistance to India. They even claim that had it not been for Pakistan's objections and fears, their assistance to India would have been on a much larger scale. As it is, they say, the aid given to India is limited in quantity and defensive in character.

The agreement reached at Nassau was to the effect that the United States and the United Kingdom would offer military assistance to India of the value of 120 million dollars. A few months later, on 30th June, a joint communique was issued by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan announcing their further decision to give long term military assistance to India over and above that which had already been provided for under the Nassau Agreement. We are not yet in a position to inform the House about the exact scope and nature of this latest agreement, for its terms have not been disclosed to us. When they are, we shall, should the need and the opportunity for it arise during the session, announce them in the House, or inform the nation of them through the Press.

I have stated that in spite of our best efforts, we have not been able to dissuade the United States and the United Kingdom from taking the decision to give long term military assistance to India. It may be that under that decision the aid will be limited in quantity or that it will be of a defensive character. However, let me say that we find no satisfaction in the assurance that the aid will be of a limited, controllable and defensive character, for we know that these are fatuous qualifications. In practical and pragmatic terms, they are meaningless.

This being the position, how then can Pakistan safeguard its independence and territorial integrity? We have been told that in the twentieth century it is not possible for a state to embark on naked aggression against another, such as ours, with its population of one hundred million. We have replied that this argument is not a tenable one. Even if it be assumed that India will not be in a position to embark on wholesale aggression against Pakistan, the situation between the two countries will still further deteriorate, for India will have been put in such a position as to be able to dictate to a neighbouring country from a position of strength.

India's bargaining position will thus be artificially increased to such an extent as will preclude, for all time, the possibility of its agreeing to a settlement on any except its own inequitable terms with a country which is militarily its inferior. The issue thus is not only that India is receiving military assistance, which may be used against Pakistan, but also that the augmentation of India's military strength invests it with a most dangerous power of dictating its own terms in its disputes with other states. That too is a matter which we have to consider very seriously. Time is running out. With the passage of time, as the military and economic strength of India increases, the possibilities of its agreeing to a peaceful and reasonable settlement of our outstanding disputes with it are correspondingly reduced.

I have mentioned the important development that followed the November crisis. When we agreed to negotiations with India over the Kashmir problem, we had said that it was necessary for the Western Powers to link up military assistance to India with an honourable settlement on Kashmir. Now there should be no misunderstanding about it. It was not that we were trying to take advantage of the situation that had been created for India. In terms of political realism and morality our plea was justifiable and righteous. We were making a request which, if agreed to, would have yielded positive and substantial results. We were not linking our problems or disputes with the problems or disputes of India with any other country. All that we were doing was to link, as history had already linked, the grave issue of happiness or misery for the Kashmiri people with that of peace or war in our area. If there had been a settlement of the Kashmir problem on an honourable and equitable basis, that would have provided a great opportunity for the pursuit of peaceful policies in the entire sub-continent. Such a settlement would have released new energies and opened up new paths of mutual co-operation between the peoples of Pakistan and India. But unfortunately, India was not serious about a Kashmir settlement.

India did not really fear Chinese aggression, for it knew, as did the rest of us, that the conflict with China was no more than a border clash, brought about by India's own impetuosity. That being the position, what India really wanted was to augment its military strength and potential to be directed, not so much against Communist China, as against the country which it had declared to be its Enemy Number One. Today we are faced with a delicate situation" which might lead us to the threshold of a new phase of our national history. This situation is engaging the most serious attention of the Government. This much we know and can say that if, God forbid, we should be involved in a clash with India, that is if India were, in its frustration to turn its guns against Pakistan, the international position being what it is, Pakistan would not be alone.

That conflict would not involve Pakistan only. An attack by India on Pakistan would no longer confine the stakes to the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan. An attack by India on Pakistan would also involve the security and territorial integrity of the largest state in Asia. This new factor that has arisen is a very important one. I would not, at this stage, wish to elucidate it any further. It would suffice to say that the national interests of another state would be involved in an Indian attack on Pakistan because that state and other states know about India's aggressive intentions and know that India is capable of embarking on aggression against other countries. Therefore, a defeated Pakistan or a subjugated Pakistan would not only mean annihilation for us but also pose a serious threat to other countries of Asia and particularly to the largest state of Asia. From that point of view and as a result of the other international factors that have recently come into operation, I think I can confidently say that every thing is being done by the Government to see that our national interests and territorial integrity are safeguarded and protected.

At the same time, I would like to say that in spite of the grave crisis that we face, we should not feel alarmed to the point of permitting any sort of moral

imbalance to develop in our national life. Our people will face the present crisis, as they have faced all crises in the past, with calmness and dignity,

The United States has declared that the military assistance which Pakistan has received from it is not to be used against India and that similarly the military assistance which India is receiving from it is not to be used against Pakistan. The United States maintains that just as the arms given by it to Pakistan are so controlled that they cannot be used by Pakistan against India, it will be ensured that the arms given by it to India will not be used against Pakistan. Even though I have expressed my doubts about its efficacy, this guarantee exists. This fact is not without importance in the context of the present situation.

The question now is that of maintaining a military balance between Pakistan and India in order to prevent a conflict in the subcontinent. In view of the arms build-up in India, it becomes incumbent upon Pakistan to increase its own military strength. The argument that the United States does not give military assistance to Pakistan to be used against India is no longer valid. If military assistance to India is controllable so that it cannot be used against Pakistan, further augmentation of Pakistan's military strength, in order to assure a balance, need not be regarded as directed against India, for additional military assistance to Pakistan should also be capable of being controlled. It is imperative that in the interest of peace there should be a military balance between India and Pakistan and an assurance that this balance will not be upset so that neither state becomes capable of embarking on aggression against the other.

We have in the past experienced many vicissitudes in our relations with the Western Powers. For the present deterioration in our relations with them, we are not responsible, any more than we are responsible for the developments which have led to it. It is for the Western Powers to arrest this deterioration.

It is for them to act in such a manner as to assure the security of Pakistan and the inviolability of its political, economic and social systems.

The House particularly wishes to be informed on the question Of our negotiations with India over Kashmir. I should like to take this opportunity to make a brief statement about them. The discussion at our first meeting at Rawalpindi was confined to a preliminary examination of the points of view of India and Pakistan, in particular of the issues involved in the dispute as India saw them. At Delhi, where we had the second round of talks, we pressed further our contention that the only honourable method of solving the Kashmir problem was that the people of Kashmir should decide their own future. In the third round of talks we continued to press for a plebiscite under the aegis of the United Nations. India raised various objections to the procedure of a plebiscite, whether an overall one or a limited one. It was in the course of this round that the Indians gave us their proposal, which was none other than that which they had suggested in the past. It amounted to nothing more than a readjustment of the existing cease-fire line. They were reminded that, at the very outset, in the first round of talks in Rawalpindi, we had told them that if they were to put forward a proposal for a settlement on the basis of the cease-fire line, it would be wholly unacceptable to us, and that, therefore, any such proposal would not provide even a starting point for the discussions. Nonetheless, that was what the Indians put forward. Pakistan naturally rejected it. True, we were advised that this proposal should be regarded only as the beginning, that it should not be considered to represent India's final position and that, therefore, we should persist in the negotiations.

In the fourth round, the issues were related not to Kashmir, but to the question of our boundary agreement with China. In the fifth round at Karachi, we reached a stalemate. It was apparent that India would not move forward at all. Thereafter, in the sixth and final round, we informed the Indian Delegation that in our view a plebiscite was the only honourable,

practical and proper basis for a settlement of the Kashmir problem. We were quite willing that, for about one year, the Valley of Kashmir be put under international control, with the provision that, at the end of that period, to ascertain the wishes of its people, a plebiscite shall be held or their wishes ascertained through some other method and their future decided accordingly. This proposal, which we considered to be a fair one for an honourable and equitable settlement of the Kashmir dispute, was also rejected by India.

I might here mention that the proposal for a partial plebiscite which was first made by General McNaughton and then by Sir Owen Dixon had been favorably considered by past Governments of Pakistan. The only variation which we made in it was to limit the plebiscite to the Valley, whose future constitutes the crux of the problem. It is in the Valley that the majority of the people of the state live. We proposed that for a period of a year or so, I would say at the most a year or fifteen months, there should be some agency—an impartial international agency—to supervise and control the administration of the Valley and that this agency should be empowered to hold a plebiscite at the end of that period. This proposal was rejected by India as being in essence the same as the one which had been advocated by Pakistan in the past. It has often been asked whether there has been any advantage in having had these negotiations with India. I think history alone can be the judge of that question. But it is our view that Pakistan has definitely gained by entering into them. I shall briefly state the reasons for this view. First, as far as the United Nations was concerned, the problem of Kashmir had lost its urgency and importance. Moreover, the Soviet Union always exercised its veto whenever an attempt was made to get the Security Council to adopt an effective resolution on Kashmir. In the meantime, India had consolidated its position in Kashmir.

Furthermore, in the last ten years, India had built the fortress of its case on the assumption that there was no Kashmir problem, that Kashmir was an integral and inseparable part of India, that constitutionally, politically and

economically, it was as much a part of India as any other of its provinces, that the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir had taken certain fundamental decisions as to the future of the state, that they had had three elections in Kashmir and that as far as the reality of international politics was concerned there was no such thing as a Kashmir dispute or a Kashmir problem. This view was put forward not only by India but was also advocated by certain important and powerful states, whose names are known to the members of this House. One of these states is so important as to have the right of veto in the Security Council. The recent negotiations are overwhelming evidence of the fact that the Kashmir problem continues to exist and that it is a major problem affecting international peace and security.

At the end of the negotiations in May, a communique was issued in which it was admitted by India that the negotiations did not result in the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Thus the contention which had in the past been advanced by India and propagated throughout the world that there was no such thing as the problem of Kashmir has been debunked. That incidentally has caused some embarrassment to the great Power which had supported the Indian stand. Moreover there is evidence that in the view of the Indian Press and the Indian public opinion, if from these negotiations any benefit has accrued to any party, it has not accrued to India. We have lost nothing through them. On the contrary, I submit that we have gained. World attention has again been focused on the Kashmir dispute and its importance as an international issue has been highlighted. That importance will continue to be recognised until an honourable and equitable solution is found for it.

The members of the House also wish to be informed about the boundary agreement with China. On that matter, I beg to submit that in December 1960 we had decided to make a proposal to China for the demarcation of our undefined boundary with it. In February 1961, we entered into negotiations with that country. In March 1961 we made to it a formal request for a boundary agreement.

As a result, some preliminary exchanges of views on the subject took place, but no substantial progress was made. At that time India contended with the People's Republic of China that Pakistan had no right to negotiate for that part of Kashmir, which, though under Pakistan's physical control, was a part of the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and legally a part of India, and that India was the only sovereign authority to negotiate a settlement of the boundary in question.

In support of this contention, India tried to muster the assistance of the Soviet Union and some other Powers. However, in spite of Indian demarches, our negotiations with China made satisfactory progress. The Sino-Indian conflict gave a fresh impetus to these negotiations. You can well understand the reason for it. No state would care to be confronted at the same time with problems or unresolved situations on two fronts. Be that as it may, we were the gainers by entering into negotiations to delimit our boundary with China. We saw no reason to delay the conclusion of an agreement about it, for we ourselves had initiated the negotiations. The late Mr. Mohammed Ali of Bogra was to go to the People's Republic of China to conclude the agreement. Most unfortunately, he did not live to do so, and I had to go in his place. We came to a speedy and satisfactory settlement of the boundary. Under this settlement, Pakistan gained about 750 square miles of territory, some of it rich in natural resources, particularly the salt mines of Oprang, which the people of Hunza and the surrounding territory consider necessary for their needs and for their economic well being. It is a matter of the greatest importance that through this agreement we have removed any possibility of friction on our only common border with the People's Republic of China. We have eliminated what might well have become a source of misunderstanding and of future troubles.

As far as Afghanistan is concerned, you know that for a number of years our relations with that country had been going from bad to worse. I should not

like now to go into the question why those relations deteriorated. I would only submit that it was not at our initiative that there was a break in them. It was Afghanistan which about two years ago severed diplomatic relations with Pakistan.

This was sad and painful for us, for Afghanistan is a neighbour of ours and a Muslim country. Because of these facts, we have always desired to have with it the best of relations. This year, due to the initiative of the Shahinshah of Iran, who made strenuous efforts in this respect, we entered into negotiations for the resumption of diplomatic and trade relations with Afghanistan. These negotiations which took place in Teheran were most fruitful. As a consequence, I am happy to inform the House that we shall in the near future be sending an Ambassador to Kabul. The person we have chosen for this post is an outstanding man, possessed of military and diplomatic experience. He has been a General in our army and has held important ambassadorial assignments. This person is General Yusuf, who at present is our High Commissioner in the United Kingdom. He will go to Kabul as soon as possible.

As I have said, it is our cherished desire to have normal, indeed friendly, relations with all countries, particularly with such of them as are our neighbours. We have no ill-will or animosity towards any of them. We wish to live in peace, in mutual understanding and friendship with all countries. In the achievement of this objective we have fully succeeded, except in so far as only one state is concerned. That state is India.

We have always advocated the method of negotiation for settling disputes and resolving problems, as we did with China. If you agree to peaceful methods of settlement of disputes, you must also agree to the principle of give and take. That being so, especially when the two negotiating states are neighbours and on friendly terms, what is important is not any one part or aspect of the negotiations between them but their cumulative outcome, their

total effect on the entirety of a situation. When in order to resolve a dispute, you enter into meaningful negotiations, you cannot proceed on the basis of take it or leave it, for that can only result in a breakdown of the talks. If this proposition is not accepted by my friends of the Opposition, then there is no purpose and no point in the Government entering into any negotiations to resolve any dispute.

I said that we had gained 750 square miles of territory from the People's Republic of China. Has that not been a real gain for us ? And China, too, did not lose on the whole. In fact, it gained in the sense that it came to a settlement over the question of the boundary with Pakistan, hitherto an undefined boundary. The settlement laid the foundation for normal and good neighborly relations. After all what is our objective? If the objective is to seek the good of our own country and also to seek the good of the world at large, then it can be achieved only through such settlements as the one we have arrived at with China. Our aim is to have the most friendly and peaceful relations with as many countries as possible. I am happy to be able to say that our endeavors in pursuit of that aim have yielded good results. We have arrived at the boundary settlement with the People's Republic of China, so that we should have a peaceful and harmonious relationship with that great country and that there should be no cause for misunderstanding or friction over our common boundary. We have resumed diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, a Muslim country, so that we should be able to live with it in peace, amity and good neighborliness. We have settled outstanding issues with Iran, the country with whom we have always had the friendliest of relations. We have sorted out our differences with Burma and it is hoped that, before the end of the year, the President of the Revolutionary Council of Burma will visit Pakistan. We have greatly improved our relations with Nepal, a fact highlighted by the visit of our President to that country. We recently had the honour of having the President of Indonesia in our midst. This has been most satisfactory in that it has led to the consolidation of our relations with Indonesia, a Muslim country of a hundred million people. With Ceylon,

too, we have good friendly relations. On the invitation of its Government, our President will pay a visit to Ceylon this year. With the Philippines and Thailand, which are our allies, we have the most amicable and cordial relations.

Thus, we are on good terms with all our neighbours, near or distant, except India. India is on bad terms not only with us but also with almost all its other neighbours. The arrogant attitude of the Government of India and its refusal to adopt a spirit of conciliation in its dealings with neighbouring countries has brought about a situation which is most unfortunate and undesirable for Pakistan as well as for other countries. I would not like to name those countries. They are known to the members of the House. We know what kind of relations India has with its neighbour Pakistan. its neighbour the People's Republic of China and its other neighbours. The whole world knows it. How is it that all countries, except India, can, on a basis of mutual understanding, achieve a settlement of their differences with others ? Why cannot India ? That country stands out as the great exception amongst those that are seeking to bring about understanding, tranquillity and peace in this region and in the world.

Recently there have been negotiations for an Air Service Agreement between Pakistan and China. There have been references to this matter in the press. This Agreement is likely to be of great commercial importance for us. It will reduce the air distance between Pakistan and Japan by three to four hours. Correspondingly it will also reduce the distance of flights from other parts of the world passing through Pakistan to Tokyo.

In order to be able to extend PIA services to Tokyo, we had asked for landing rights in Hong Kong. Unfortunately these rights were not granted to us. We had, therefore, to ask for landing rights in the territory of the People's Republic of China. Those rights having been granted, we should now be able to take our air network around the world. I should mention for the

information of the House that other countries have also asked for transit rights through the People's Republic of China for their airlines and are ready to negotiate with it for them.

Before I resume my seat, I should like to say that we realise that the situation with which we are faced is a grave one. We know that the days ahead are going to be difficult. I wish to assure the House that we are making every effort to resolve the situation and to ward off danger to our national security. In this endeavour, we need the co-operation of the representatives of the nation here in this Assembly and in the Provincial Assemblies. At this juncture, nothing can be a greater source of strength to the Government than the support of the people. We know that they appreciate the magnitude of the crisis confronting the country. We believe that they can and will help their Government to surmount it. We should not like to see a deterioration of our relations with the Western Powers. However, it is not for us to take the initiative in this matter, because we are the injured party; we are the ones who have cause to feel concerned. It is for them to take the necessary measures—and these measures can be taken—to bring about a change in the situation which would be in the interest of our mutual relations.

As far as the question of Kashmir is concerned, it remains the most important, indeed, the basic issue in Pakistan's foreign policy. This issue is responsible for the great gulf that divides us and India. It constitutes a grave problem for the world. Although we have a great stake in it, the stake of the Kashmiris is the greatest of all. It is nothing short of a tragedy that they are being denied their right of self-determination. In fact they are the only people in this region who still suffer under a colonial regime and an oppressive regime at that. Today, the people of Kashmir are being called up to contribute to the war effort of India. They have no concern at all with the so-called threat to India or with the armed conflict in which India is involved. Kashmir is not a part of India.

Finally, I should like to say on behalf of the Government that we are looking forward to this debate on foreign policy. I wish to express the hope that after the members have spoken, I shall be afforded an opportunity to elucidate the position of the Government on the points raised by them.

VI

Boundary Agreement with Iran — Relations with Afghanistan and other Asian Countries — Kashmir Not a Settled Question — Relations with the West (24th July 1963)

I am thankful to the Chair for the indulgence that has been shown to me in permitting me to address the House while sitting in my seat. I also wish to apologise to those members of the House whose speeches I was not able to hear. This was because I could not be present in the House on account of my illness to which you, Sir, have alluded in such sympathetic terms. There was, of course, no question of discourtesy on my part to the members. However, I have asked to be furnished with a full record of the proceedings of the House, so that I should be fully informed of all that was said in my absence.

I do not know whether it would be appropriate for me to refer to the recriminations that some members have indulged in during last forty-eight hours. However, I am a human being, with all the failings of a human being. As such, it should surprise no one if I were tempted to reply to the wholly incorrect and unfounded personal allegations that have been made against me by certain members of the House. But, on further consideration, I have decided to refrain from doing so, for the very good reason that the allegations are so obviously false, and known to be such to every one, that it would be a waste of the time of the House to attempt to answer them.

Some of the points made by the members of the Opposition about foreign policy in the course of this debate were mutually contradictory. On the one hand, we were told that the Government had not come forward with a forthright and positive foreign policy and that it had taken shelter behind time-worn phrases and apologies which have been repeated with monotonous regularity for the past fifteen years. For their part, the members of the Opposition have not made any concrete suggestions as to policy. After all, they are representatives of the people and in this House collectively represent one hundred million people. If, according to the Opposition, we, ;n

the Government, have not been able to enunciate a bold and clear foreign policy, such as is required by our present circumstances and the prevailing conditions, the eminent members of the Opposition ought to come forward with ideas about such a policy. However, they have not made any constructive suggestions,

We have been told that by the manner in which we go about begging for arms we have made an international nuisance of ourselves. I admit that one should be ashamed to beg. However, if the interests of the country demand that we should beg, then I suggest that begging becomes an act of patriotism and as such deserves commendation rather than condemnation.

Actually the question of begging does not arise. The fact is that the geopolitical position of Pakistan is important to the world and to the global strategy of the great Powers. We do not get aid and assistance because we beg for it. We get aid and assistance because Pakistan is a nation of a hundred million people with a geopolitical position of great importance. West Pakistan adjoins the Middle East, a region of vital concern to the world. The other half of the country i.e., East Pakistan, is on the periphery of the sensitive areas of South East Asia. That being so it is in the interest of certain Powers to give aid to Pakistan. Pakistan having committed itself to defence alliances with those Powers, they are giving it aid. Thus there is mutuality of interests and reciprocity between Pakistan and those who give it assistance.

We were told that India is being armed menacingly by the same Powers and that the arms which are being given to it will be used against no other country than Pakistan. On the other hand, some members said that under no circumstances could India be a threat to Pakistan, for India was in a state of decomposition. As a matter of fact, one member said not that the process of disintegration was about to begin in India but that it had already started. He argued that therefore all the aid and assistance that India was receiving or might receive in the future would not really pose a threat to Pakistan.

Such statements are mutually contradictory. We have been advised by some members that Pakistan should not grudge massive military assistance to India because it was in the interest of the global strategy of the Western Powers to give such assistance to India. If it is claimed that this statement reflects the true state of public opinion in Pakistan then we should like the members who have made or support it to prove it. If the people of Pakistan are reconciled to this new development, then we should have no grievance against any one and indeed accept the contention that it is in the global interest of the Western Powers to give military assistance to India.

However, this is not the correct position. I submit that the people of Pakistan are deeply concerned about the military assistance which is being given to India. Their concern is based on the fact that India has committed aggression on no less than five occasions during the last fifteen years and principally against Pakistan. We have, therefore, every cause to feel concerned. Really and fundamentally, it is not because of their global interests that the great Powers are giving this massive assistance to India. They are giving it in order to make another Chungking out of New Delhi, to make another Kuomintang out of the present Indian regime. We know the fate of the assistance which was given to Chiang Kai-Shek. Chiang's China was in a state of decay and decomposition and consequently the assistance given to it could not be effectively utilised. India, too, is in a state of decay and degeneration. The result of giving it aid will be the same as it was in the case of China.

Some members of the House have charged the Government with having given away 3,000 square miles of our national territory to Iran without giving any information about it to this House. The Iran-Pakistan boundary agreement was concluded as far back as 6th February 1958. What took place on 15th July 1963 was purely the ceremonial act of the transfer of the areas concerned. This arose out of the obligation incurred by both the countries under the boundary agreement of 6th February 1958. It is not a fact that

Pakistan has given away 3,000 square miles to Iran. We agreed to give to Iran 310 square miles of its territory, which had been forcibly occupied by the British, when they were rulers of the sub-continent and against which occupation the Government of Iran had always protested. In 1871, 1896 and 1905 Britain had forced Iran to conclude boundary agreements with it. But the Iranian Government had consistently refused to demarcate the boundary on the basis of those agreements. With the advent of Pakistan, and in view of its friendly and fraternal relations with Iran, a solution of this problem, which had been left over by history, became possible.

While the Government of Pakistan will transfer some 310 and not 3,000 square miles of territory to Iran, territory which had been in de facto occupation of the British Government of India, the Government of Iran has ceded 95 square miles of territory, hitherto under its occupation, to the Government of Pakistan. If the demarcation of the border had taken place in accordance with the 1905 agreement, concluded between the British and the Iranians, 300 square miles of territory would have had to be relinquished to Iran, but there would have been no cession by Iran of the 95 square miles of the territory which we are now acquiring under the agreement of 1958. I should, therefore, say that Pakistan has actually gained 95 square miles of territory under the border agreement with Iran. The ceremony about it which took place in Quetta on 15th July 1963 finally seals the friendship which has so long existed between Iran and Pakistan. As the members of the House are aware, Iran supports the right of self-determination of the people of Kashmir in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations. I hope I have said enough about our relations with Iran and the actual position in respect of the boundary agreement that has recently been concluded between that country and Pakistan.

Reference has also been made to our relations with Afghanistan, a Muslim country and a neighbour of ours. We have the greatest respect for the people of Afghanistan. It was not of our choosing that diplomatic relations between

Pakistan and Afghanistan were severed. We are aware of the fantastic territorial claim that has been made in Afghanistan against our country. I would not wish to mention this aspect of our problem, for, with the restoration of diplomatic relations between our two countries, we should all like to see the beginning of a new chapter of understanding between the peoples of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

As I have said, all that we have done is to restore diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. That answers the question of my friend, the leader of the Opposition. However, through the re-establishment of diplomatic relations and through contacts at various other levels, we hope we shall be able to settle also other problems which exist between Afghanistan and ourselves. In the same spirit, we are anxious to settle any problems that there might be between us and any other country. It was in this spirit that we asked the Government of India that it should co-operate with us in solving the Kashmir question which has been a bar to goodwill between the people of India and the people of Pakistan.

We have settled our differences with other countries through the process of negotiation. Nor is this surprising, for as a member of the United Nations, we are committed to the peaceful settlement of disputes. My friends opposite have said that Pakistan should not claim credit for the good relations it has with its neighbours, Nepal, Ceylon, Indonesia, Burma and Afghanistan. I did not refer to our good relations with these countries with the object of claiming any credit for them, but only to show the contrast which exists between their attitude and India's. India's attitude is one of arrogance and intransigence in approaching problems which adversely affect its relations with its neighbours. What I said was meant to be more of an observation on India's attitude, intolerant and unaccommodating, towards its neighbours, Pakistan, Ceylon and China. Yet India claims to be a peace-loving state. The best way for it to demonstrate its peaceful intention and professions is to settle its disputes, not only with us, but with all its other neighbours, for we

earnestly desire that all countries in the region should live in peace and concord with each other

Unfortunately, India is the spoilt child of the world. India gets away with all its machinations by irrational explanations which the world only too readily swallows. The misfortune of this region is that the Powers which are not familiar with India's mentality and do not understand India's approach to international problems are only too eager to accept India's policies on their face value. That makes it possible for India to continue to menace the peace of the region and the world.

Now, it has been said that we made a mistake in entering into negotiations with India on Kashmir. Our friends opposite have criticised us for having had these talks, but they have not given any good reasons for this criticism. The assumptions on which they proceed are not correct. They have said that by entering into the talks we compromised the Kashmiris' right of self-determination. I categorically declare that under no circumstances could that right have been compromised because of our negotiations with India. In round after round in the first round, the second round, the third round, the fourth round, the fifth round and the sixth round, the right of self-determination of the people of Kashmir constituted our basic stand for a settlement. As stated earlier, in the ultimate analysis, it would be found that by entering into these negotiations we were the gainers.

I shall now show how, on the other hand, India was the loser through these negotiations. You will recall that during the past fifteen years, India always took the position that the problem of Kashmir had been settled and finished with. India maintained that Kashmir was an integral part of the Indian Union as much as Maharashtra or Orissa or Madras; that constitutionally, politically, economically, socially and in every other way, the people of Kashmir were a part and parcel, and an inextricable one, of the Indian nation; and that consequently there was no such thing as a Kashmir dispute. In this respect, I

should like to quote from some important statements made on behalf of India:

"... Kashmir is the northern extremity of India the idea that this is in occupation, which is what has been represented to the Security Council, is a total misnomer The right of secession then, does not exist in our federation the Government of India cannot ever accept the idea that accession is anything but an indissoluble bond. When Kashmir acceded that matter was finished."

—Mr. Krishna Menon in the Security Council on 23rd January, 1957.

"Therefore the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the 27th October was full and final accession ... So far as the sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir is concerned it has become the sovereignty of the Indian Union by the act of accession, by the treaty of the Maharaja with the British Crown . . . There is no such thing in our Constitution as provisional accession . . ."

—Mr. Krishna Menon in the Security Council on 3rd May, 1962.

"... we regard the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to the Union of India as full, complete and final, irrevocable and what is more, perpetual we shall not at any time submit this matter to what is called mediation or arbitration . . ."

—Mr. Krishna Menon in the Security Council on 4th May, 1962.

That was the position of the Government of India. It was on the basis of that position that India refused to reopen discussions on the Kashmir problem or to recognise it as a dispute and sought and received the support of the Soviet Union when Mr. Khrushchev visited India in 1955. At that time the Soviet leaders were told: that this was India's final position; that India would never agree to negotiate on Kashmir, either directly with Pakistan or through the United Nations. It was on this basis that the Soviet Union lent its powerful support to India on the Kashmir question. But when negotiations

were now reopened, it meant that India admitted the existence of the Kashmir dispute, for India came to the negotiating table to settle "the Kashmir dispute on an equitable and honourable basis." These are the words of the Joint Communique of 29th November 1962. This remained the position even after the conclusion of the talks when it was jointly stated that India and Pakistan had sought to arrive at an honourable and equitable solution of the Kashmir dispute but had been unable to do so. India has thus been led to abandon the premise of the finality of accession on the basis of which it had obtained the consistent support of the Soviet Union in the Security Council debates on Kashmir. This Government can take real and purposeful pride in having restored to the Kashmir question its status as one of the most important disputes facing the world.

Let me say, however, that the Kashmir problem is not one of our creation. We inherited it from the previous Governments of Pakistan. Who was responsible for stopping the fighting in Kashmir? Who was responsible for entering into the cease-fire agreement with India? Surely not this Government. The truth is that the previous Governments were responsible for mishandling the Kashmir problem. Weakness and vacillation characterised their policies. Their political instability had sapped the vitality of the country. If we are responsible for anything it is for having restored internal stability and resuscitated the Kashmir question.

We have made at least some progress in respect of Kashmir. We have through our exertions brought the problem back before the eyes of the world. It is once again recognised as one of the most urgent problems facing the international community.

It has been stated that we missed a golden opportunity to settle the Kashmir question when there was fighting between China and India. I think that is a very irresponsible and short-sighted view. As I have said, by our tireless efforts and by our constant endeavours, we have made the Kashmir problem

a live problem again. We have brought it down from the shelf to which it had been relegated.

To take advantage of the Sino-Indian conflict, India is determined to exaggerate its nature and extent. India's main aim of course is to acquire arms for purposes other than a war with China. In pursuit of that aim a war hysteria has been created in India. Economic policies have been adopted which bear heavily upon the common man. India has adopted a course of action which is impracticable and utterly futile. It has already caused a sense of demoralization amongst the people of that country and has increased the corruption and nepotism rampant in it. Nevertheless, in pursuit of its policies, the Government of India continues to enforce stringent measures. As a result of these measures, the people of that country are living in circumstances, of which economic distress is the normal characteristic and in which they have to suffer hardships and make sacrifices for a cause that they do not understand. How long can the Government of India sustain such policies against the will of its people? After all, the people of India are human beings", they need food, shelter and clothing like any other people. Denied most of these basic needs, they live in poverty, squalor and misery. The result is utter despondency.

Now, if that is the state of the feeling of the people of India, I ask you, what is the state of the feeling of the people of Kashmir who are not a part of the Indian nation and who have never regarded Kashmir as a part of India? Why should they be made to suffer privations and make sacrifices for a cause which is not their's, for a conflict in which they are not involved and in which they have no stake? Kashmir is a disputed territory. This fact India has acknowledged in the past and acknowledges it even today. Why should the people of Kashmir be called upon to suffer for the sake of India, in whose colonial bondage they are? India has no right to ask them to make sacrifices for a cause which is not their's. This is an important issue. In the past, India used to tell the world that Pakistan was a mediaeval theocratic state in which

democracy did not exist. On the contrary, it was claimed that India had democratic institutions and had had three elections, and that it had steel mills, had otherwise made considerable economic progress and that the Indian people were leading a better life. And they argued that the people of Kashmir wished to be a part of the Indian nation, which had attained such prosperity. But can India even now maintain that the people of Kashmir want to be a part of India? Indeed not and yet they are called upon to make the most painful sacrifices for the sake of India and to fight a war which they do not want.

If the people of Kashmir were today in Pakistan, they would, like the people of Azad Kashmir, Gilgit or Hunza, have been living in peace and security, with no conflict with their northern neighbour. But they are in Indian bondage and their land has been converted into a battle-ground. India has deprived Kashmir of its peace, Tranquillity and security and turned it into a theatre of war against the People's Republic of China. These are important considerations which should be taken account of in the settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

First, the people of Kashmir have been called upon to bear privations and make sacrifices for the sake of India in a conflict to which they are not a party. Secondly, they have to contend with the way that armaments and implements of war have been thrown into their land. Because India cannot keep Kashmir under subjugation much longer, this state of affairs is bound to result in an explosion. To avoid that explosion India should agree to settle the problem of its future on equitable and honourable terms. If that were done, Pakistan would be willing to live in peace and friendship with India, is Pakistan has been living with all its other neighbours such as Ceylon. Afghanistan, Iran, Burma, and China. We would welcome Much a development.

We are a nation that does not believe in conflict or war. Our history shows that we have never resorted to force. On the contrary, we have always exercised restraint in the face of provocation. It is India that has resorted to war and threats of war. But time is running But for India. It is now being exposed and. in the process, is being isolated.

First things must come first. India must realize what its real Position is. In Asia today, India is a suspect nation. It is a nation which is not trusted by its neighbours. It is not trusted by the people's Republic of China. There is tension between India and Indonesia. There is deep suspicion about India's motives and conduct in Asian-African countries generally. How long can India persist in its follies and play the role of an arrogant isolated nation? India is not great enough nor big enough to play that role. Let India forsake its high and mighty posture. Let India settle on honourable terms its disputes with Pakistan. If India would only do that, a great and glorious era for the peoples of the sub-continent would be ushered in.

India has offered Pakistan a No War Pact. We do not see the hand of friendship in this offer. It is in fact a sinister offer. While the Kashmir dispute exists it is inconceivable that we should accept India's offer of a No War Pact. If we accept it, we shall in effect accept the cease-fire line as the final boundary between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. In other words, we shall be agreeing to the settlement of the Kashmir question through partition on the basis of the status quo as India desires. Thus a No War Pact, under the present circumstances, would mean the settlement of the problem of Kashmir on the basis of the status quo, without reference to its people, to which Pakistan will never agree—today, tomorrow, or a hundred years hence.

Furthermore, what does history teach us about No War Pacts? The fate of the Kellogg Pact is well known. Nazi Germany concluded a No War Pact with the Soviet Union, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. Yet Germany invaded the Soviet Union. A No War Pact with India can have the effect only of lulling us into a

false sense of security and making us feel that India would not resort to force against us. Then, we could become easy victims of Indian aggression. In the last fifteen years, India has committed aggression as many as five times.

A No War Pact would be pressed into service by India as an estoppel on the Kashmir problem. Just as India has claimed that Pakistan is estopped by the Indus Basin Treaty from asserting its rights in respect of the Chenab river, India will, if Pakistan agrees to a No War Pact, claim in the same unscrupulous manner that Pakistan has accepted the present cease-fire line as a final settlement of the Kashmir question. The status quo would thus be perpetuated.

Both India and Pakistan are members of the United Nations and share, with all its member states, the obligation to settle their problems by peaceful procedures such as negotiation, conciliation, mediation and arbitration, as provided by Article 33 of the Charter. We on our part have peaceful intentions. This is evident from our conduct in international affairs during the past fifteen years, which is an enviable record for any peace-loving state. Unlike India, we attach very great importance to our reputation as a peace-loving state and to faithfully carrying out our international obligations. India merely wants to throw dust into the eyes of the world by saying that it offered Pakistan a No War Pact, which Pakistan refused. We are willing to have a No War Pact with India the moment it settles the Kashmir dispute. We are willing to enter into economic collaboration with India, the moment it puts an end to this problem. This problem, I declare, must be settled, and it will be settled, because no one can deny justice for all time to the people of Kashmir. Future history will show that the people of Kashmir will not for ever be denied their inalienable right of self-determination, the right which we have emphasized in all our negotiations with India.

Coming to our relations with the Western Powers, I am compelled to say that there has been a distorted presentation of facts by the members of the Opposition. It is not correct that we are putting forward a, new plea for

charity, on the score that since India is now receiving so much more, Pakistan, too, should receive more. That is a gross and unfortunate misrepresentation of our position. What I stated was that tension existed in the sub-continent because there was in it a military imbalance. During the past fifteen years, we made sacrifices to maintain a military balance. We did so because history shows that in any given area the temptation of some states to resort to arms can be checked only through maintaining in it a balance of power. It has been in the interest of peace and security that we maintained some sort of military balance with India. Today, that balance is being upset. What we said was that the West should realise that this spelt danger and, if it wished to see peace and security in the sub-continent, it should do something to restore the balance. That is all that we said. We did not say that we were pleading for additional arms aid.

We have been associates of the West in defence alliances. We have been its comrades all these years. We have been with it through a series of crises. We have made sacrifices for the West. When the U-2 plane, supposed to have taken off from Peshawar, was shot down over Russia, Mr. Khrushchev did not say that India would be annihilated. He said that Pakistan would be annihilated. We have staked our whole future in the alliances with the West. We have staked involvement in a nuclear war in the event of a clash between the two blocs. And, yet what is happening today? We are, in the words of the unsophisticated, "being detached".

We wish to rehabilitate our relationship with the Western Powers, to revive our happier past association with them. It is for them to realise that Pakistan is the injured party. It is for them to understand the difficulties and dangers that Pakistan is facing. The point of nemesis has been reached. We ask the Western Powers to appreciate the issues involved, to hold the line and to bring about a new era of goodwill and co-operation, such as formerly existed between them and us. We value their friendship. They have assisted us in many ways. They have made a valuable contribution to our economic growth

and to our military security. We are not unmindful of these facts. We are not ungrateful. Whatever may be the faults and follies of the people of Pakistan, one thing cannot be said of them, namely that they are an ungrateful people.

All that we are doing is to ask the West to appreciate the fact that India's increased military strength can only be directed against Pakistan. India has repeatedly said that Pakistan is India's Enemy Number One. It is India that has committed aggression. India committed aggression in Kashmir, in Junagadh and in Hyderabad. It has also committed aggression against Goa and in the boundary conflict with China. Thus India has committed aggression five times. Having ourselves experienced Indian aggression, it is but natural that we should expect the West to help maintain the present precarious balance of power in the sub-continent.

We, on our part, shall maintain our traditional friendship with the Western Powers. We desire friendship not only with them, but also with and between all the countries of the world. We do not want to see conflict anywhere. The peoples of the world can have the opportunity of progressing socially, culturally and economically, only in conditions of undisturbed peace and security. We should like to have that opportunity for our people in order to provide them with better life, to give them more and better homes, schools and hospitals. We want our people to feel that although they were born in poverty, they do not have to live for ever in poverty. We must meet the challenge of poverty and break through the barrier of want. We can succeed in our attempt to do so only if there is peace in our region, in Asia and in the world. For that reason, we are anxious to have good, cordial and friendly relations with all countries.

So far as we are concerned, we have always done our best to help in the promotion of measures conducive to peace. We have entered into a boundary agreement with the People's Republic of China, our great neighbour with a population of 650 million. In the same spirit, we are anxious to reach an understanding with India in regard to the problems that divide our two

countries. But Pakistan by itself can do little about it. A heavy responsibility in this respect rests on India and on those nations that have now come to feel that they have a stake in India. The sooner they realise that responsibility the better will it be for all concerned.

When I speak today, I do not speak only for myself. Likewise when President Ayub speaks, he does not do so as an individual. Whenever any spokesman of the Government of Pakistan seeks to voice our deep concern over the threat to our security, he speaks for the hundred million people of this country. But, as I have said, we shall be able to meet this danger. Then there is the assurance we have from our friends, which we value, namely, that in the event of any aggression they will come to our assistance. We have assurances also from other countries that if India commits aggression against us, they will regard it as aggression against them. Thus we shall never be alone in facing aggression. We are also confident that in safeguarding Pakistan's territorial integrity and independence we shall have the support of all countries that condemn aggression, irrespective of their ideological affiliations. To oppose aggression, you do not have to subscribe to any particular ideology. Aggression is an evil for all states; it is an evil for all peoples whatever their beliefs or creed. If a crisis does come we know that we shall have the sympathy and the support of all peace-loving nations of the world, and of all states that believe in upholding the Charter of the United Nations. Even if we are alone, we shall, with faith in the righteousness of our cause, face the crisis with confidence and, I have no doubt, survive.

VII

Global Policies of the Great Powers—Interests of their Allies — Can there be a Conflict Between Them — Danger of Arms Aid to Uncommitted Countries — Interests of Pakistan—The Need for Reviewing Policy (22nd June 1964)

I have heard with great interest the views of the various members who have spoken on this important adjournment motion. As I said the other day in an interview with the Press, the Government has made every endeavour to impress upon the United States its concern about the long-term military assistance proposed to be given to India.

At various stages, and on various occasions, right from the level of the President downwards, we have discussed this problem with our friends and allies. We have made known to them the dire consequences of the policy of giving long-term military assistance to India. If, as the members of the Opposition feel, we have not been able to convince our friends of the folly of pursuing this policy, it is not because of any lapse on our part; we have done our best. These members, I submit, do not fully appreciate our difficulties, for they have no experience of contesting the global policies of a great Power.

Before 1958, there was no occasion for the Government of Pakistan to come into conflict on policy matters with the great powers. On various issues, our policies were in consonance with the interests of the great Powers. But destiny has brought about a situation in which it has fallen on us to differ on grounds of our national interests with the global policies of the great Powers. We have sought in every possible way to make them realise and appreciate the serious and even dangerous consequences of the course which they are at present pursuing in our region.

I think it would be fair to say that a time does come when the debate must end and the dialogue conclude, when the nation must re-appraise and readjust its fundamental policies. Perhaps the time has come for Pakistan to reconsider and to review its foreign policy, in the light of its basic national interests, in keeping with the changing circumstances. We have greatly benefited from the wisdom and advice of the members of the Opposition. It is only with a common approach and mutual understanding, that we can pursue meaningful policies with regard to our national interests; As I have said, the Government has gained greatly from this debate, and we hope to have close consultations with the Opposition and its leaders in the future, because these are matters which affect all of us equally.

Since the end of the last War, we have witnessed two important phenomena that have influenced the world. After the termination of the War, we saw the emergence of many independent states in Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe and we also saw the crystallisation of the ideological dispute between the free world and international communism. After the Sino-Soviet clash, that ideological conflict has today in 1964 become a little broader. But we hear—and we hear this from Soviet as well as Chinese leaders—that in the event of an international conflict, in the event of a nuclear war, the Soviet and the Chinese people will stand shoulder to shoulder. Thus we have witnessed two important phenomena in the world. One is the emergence of independent states in Asia and Africa, and in certain parts of Europe; and the other is the conflict between the two great Titans, holding different ideological values. We have also seen that the partition of states, necessary in some cases and unjustified in other has led to tensions.

It is true that, notwithstanding the end of colonialism, some of its legacies have remained. Problems have arisen between new independent sovereign states; there have been boundary disputes and various other differences, such as claims against each other by former colonial territories. These are to be seen in Africa as well as in Asia. But, there is also a resolve on the part of Asian and African states to settle their differences by peaceful

means. For instance, in Africa, we have seen that the Addis Ababa Conference has devised a machinery for the settlement of Inter-African differences. Between states that have resulted from partition, differences have been more acute. As far as our sub-continent is concerned, we fought for Pakistan, because we believed that its creation would lead to the permanent salvation and security of the people of our areas as well as the people of India. But there are in India some elements that never reconciled themselves to the division of the sub-continent. To be fair to the Indian Government, and to be fair to the former Prime Minister of India, I think, they had more or less reconciled themselves to the two-nation theory. But, nonetheless, there are powerful and militant organisations in India, which have not yet reconciled themselves to the partition. Not only are these militant organisations in India that are opposed to the two-nation theory, and to the division of the subcontinent, but have been pursuing in their own ways policies to undo it. That is why we hear some people in India talk of a confederation for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Of course, the President of Pakistan made it quite clear in his recent speech at Peshawar that such a scheme would never be acceptable to Pakistan. But the fact remains that there are people in India who have not yet reconciled themselves to the creation of Pakistan as a sovereign state.

This is a basic factor in the problem. Powerful elements, believing in Akhand Bharat, are striving to bring about a merger of India and Pakistan. Some of these elements are of a militant nature; others employ peaceful, but nonetheless for us, dangerous methods. We have to contend with these elements. The State of Pakistan was achieved after great sacrifices and as far as its people are concerned here is no question about their will and resolve to maintain its integrity and sovereignty and to resist the machinations of those who want to destroy it.

The decision of the United States of America and other Western Powers to give military assistance to India is bound to encourage those elements in

India which want to bring about a merger of the two countries, and to use military force and their power otherwise, to achieve their end. The situation, therefore is a very serious one.

We call ourselves a developing country. Nonetheless relatively speaking, we are a poor country and we cannot take upon ourselves the burden of acquiring additional arms and entering into an arms race. We must be true to ourselves, and admit that fact. While we cannot take upon ourselves that burden, the people of India cannot bear it either, because just as it will break our back. it will break their's. Imagine that out of our budget allocation of three thousand million rupees we are spending over a thousand million on arms and in the case of India with a budget of thirteen thousand million they are spending ten thousand million on arms. This is diversion of national resources into unproductive channels and is not fair to people who suffer misery and who are living in privation. This is not fair to our masses. This is not fair to the 80 per cent of our people who want a better standard of life. It is not a law of God that we should be poor and our people should suffer. The money which we are spending on arms could be better spent to improve the lot of our people. This new situation makes our task all the more complex. We should realise that with our pre-existing limitations, the present situation is going to retard our efforts to give a better life to our children and to our children's children. This is a vital consideration. But if we were to close our eyes to realities and say that we are not poor, that might satisfy our personal ego or our national ego, but that would be deceiving ourselves.

This arms race is going to lead to further aggravation of the situation and create further tensions not only within the sub-continent but in Asia at large. I say in Asia at large, because Pakistan and India are important nations of Asia; we are a hundred million people and they are four hundred million people. The arms race between India and Pakistan is bound to have its repercussions in the neighbouring countries. The present development is detrimental and injurious not only to the interests of the people of India and

Pakistan but also to those of the region as a whole. In addition to our national responsibility, we have responsibility for our region. We cannot and do not live in isolation. Ours is not a world which is comprised only of India and Pakistan. It is an international world. Pakistan and India are among the major nations of Asia. The policies that they pursue are bound to have wide repercussions.

Thus it is that the decision of the United States Administration to give long-term military assistance to India aggravates Indo-Pakistan differences and because these differences exist, the future peace of Asia is directly affected by it. These differences, we feel, can be resolved in a peaceful manner, through negotiation and in a spirit of conciliation. They are not insurmountable. With goodwill on both sides, India and Pakistan can resolve them. I am neither optimistic nor pessimistic. But it is a fact that we were moving in that direction, to some extent at last. True, we had not reached the end of the road. Far from it. But certain new developments had given us some hope that our endeavours might result in an improvement of the situation. Now, unfortunately, this decision with regard to long-term military aid to India does make our task more difficult. What were those developments? They were the release of Sheikh Abdullah, the situation in Kashmir itself, the realisation in India that it must settle its differences with Pakistan through negotiation, and that such a settlement was necessary in the interest of its masses. But just when events were moving in the right direction, came the announcement that the United States had decided to give long-term military assistance to India. I think it was meant as a sort of inducement to the Shastri Government, even before it was actually formed, to support United States policies. When the Sino-Indian conflict arose in 1962, we were told that United States and United Kingdom assistance to India was on an emergency basis and that it was being given because India faced a grave danger from China and it was not possible for the United States and the United Kingdom not to come to the assistance of India. But it was said that the aid was of an emergency nature, of an ad hoc character,

and that it was to some extent linked with the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. We felt that the link should have been much more positive, that it should have been much more clear. But the United States and the United Kingdom argued that on this point between them and us there was only a difference of approach and that they would link Kashmir in some way or the other with the military assistance they were giving to India. Thereafter at Nassau, as my friend Mr. Fazal Elahi has pointed out, the United States and the United Kingdom committed 120 million dollars worth of military assistance to India. Again, we were told that this measure was not of a permanent nature, that it was not based on a long-term policy but was merely a follow-up of the original emergency aid. Then again in 1963. there was a joint communique issued by Mr. Macmillan, then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and President Kennedy committing further aid to India to the tune of sixty million dollars. In 1964, additional aid worth sixty million dollars was committed. Now we have the announcement that there is going to be long-term military assistance from the United States to India and that it would be of the value of about one hundred million dollars a year. This means a radical change in the situation.

Because of this change, the time has come for us to review our liabilities and our position generally. We had undertaken certain political commitments, but that was done in entirely different circumstances. The new situation is such that it would be on our part a dereliction of national duty if we did not, in the light of it fully examine its political and military consequences. We must do this also in fairness to our allies, for even though they have been unfair to us we must be fair to them. Our national commitments are so heavy, the consequent responsibilities so great, and the threat to our security and integrity is now so serious that this Government would be failing our people if it did not reappraise its position political and military. This does not mean that there is going to be any radical or basic change in our policy.

We cannot act irresponsibly. We owe a duty to our friends and we owe a duty to our people. But at the same time there is no denying the fact that the country does face a serious threat. We have to reckon with that fact and I am sure that in reckoning with it in a constructive fashion the whole nation will rally round the Government. I should also recall that recently an official of the United States Administration in his testimony before a Congressional Committee said that Pakistan would sooner or later adjust itself to the military assistance that was being given to India on a long-term basis in the same way as India had adjusted itself to the long-term military assistance that was given to Pakistan. Again, in order to be fair to our allies and friends, I think it right to say that in this regard they are suffering from a misconception, for there is a basic difference between the two situations. For one thing, as far as Pakistan was concerned, it was a member of certain alliances and had undertaken certain commitments. It was in lieu of those commitments and the obligations that followed from them that Pakistan became the recipient of military assistance from the United States. As far as India is concerned that is not the position. The Indian Government has undertaken, as far as we know, no commitment and no obligation in regard to the military assistance that it is receiving from the United States. That is one difference between the two situations. The other difference is that India is four times the size of Pakistan. When Pakistan received military assistance from the United States, India almost rent the sky with protests against it. There was of course the fact that under the military assistance programme Pakistan had undertaken certain obligations. Now if India felt so seriously aggrieved about Pakistan, which had little resources of its own and which was one-fourth the size of India, receiving military assistance from the United States, one can well understand the feelings of our Government and people when India, which is four times the size of Pakistan, becomes the recipient of long-term massive military assistance from the United States and without undertaking any obligation whatsoever. These are the two differences in the situation. It must be recognized that these differences are

of a fundamental character. Therefore, the question of reconciling ourselves to the situation does not arise.

The effect on the Kashmir dispute of long-term military assistance to India is far reaching. In the beginning, we were told that the ad hoc or emergency military assistance to India was in some way linked with the Kashmir dispute, that the United States and the United Kingdom would use their influence to persuade India to arrive at a settlement of that dispute. Gradually there has been a delinking of the Kashmir question from military aid to India. The official of the United States Government, whose testimony I just quoted, recently said that the global interests of his country in the sub-continent were of greater importance to it than the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Now here we perceive a basic contradiction. What do global interests mean after all ? The global interests of the United States must necessarily comprise the interests of its allies as much as its own. If there are any elements of common understanding, common appreciation and common obligations between the United States and its allies, then the interest of the allies, who have committed themselves to the United States, form part of the global interests of the United States. Surely, therefore, the United States must take into account the interests of its allies. Now, how can the global interests of the United States be in conflict with those of its allies ? I cannot imagine that Pakistan's international interests— I shall not be so presumptuous as to say that we have global interests—can be in conflict with our friends'. If that were possible, there would be no consistency in our respective moral or even political approaches to international problems. The United States cannot say that its global interests are in conflict with the interests of its allies and, if it did, there would be a basic contradiction in its position. My friend, Mr. Mashiur Rahman, had this in mind when he said that for nations to be allies there must be an identity of purpose and a common approach to problems. If the global interests of the United States could clash with those of its allies and if they could clash with the basic national interests of Pakistan, then are we the only nation placed in that position?

It is not for me to say that Turkey and other nations also face similar serious situations. We see that at the other end of the alliance, the Turkish nation feels somewhat aggrieved, somewhat disappointed, at the lack of support from its allies on the question of Cyprus. As far as Pakistan is concerned, because of our alliance with Turkey, because of the imperishable bonds that we have with it, as soon as Turkey was confronted with the grave crisis in Cyprus, we came out uncompromisingly in support of the Turkish cause and rightly so. Alliances mean that there has to be a certain degree of give and take, not only in normal times but more particularly in times of crisis. We would have failed in our duty if we had not responded to the call of the Turkish nation for support in the Cyprus crisis.

Thus if Pakistan feels aggrieved, we are not the only people in such a situation. But where is the line going to be drawn? Either at the cost of our allies, we pursue our international interests or we abandon our allies. We cannot remain, much less can a great Power remain, on the horns of a dilemma. To change the metaphor, a great Power cannot ride two horses at the same time. Its own global interests must be consistent with the interests of its allies and friends who share with it common ideals and aspirations, and have undertaken certain obligations towards it. Or else, it must recognize that a new situation has arisen in which those alliances are no longer an asset, but rather a burden and a liability and consequently it must abandon the policy of alliances. But as I said, you cannot have it both ways. You cannot have a system of alliances and a system of betrayal of the interests of your allies. There must be consistency at least in this respect. I know it is said that consistency is a virtue of small minds. But here we are not playing with words. Here we are playing with the lives and the destinies not only of the hundred million people of Pakistan but the far larger population of the entire sub-continent, for this situation can escalate into something highly dangerous to them.

Because of this arms aid decision, we may find that the Kashmir problem has become all the more intractable and its settlement all the more difficult. I do not blame India altogether for it. After all, if India can get military assistance why should it not take it. Let India take it. But having taken it, India will discover the perils of the situation it is entering. However, that is a separate question. Although I do not put the blame so much on the Government or the people of India, I have no doubt that they will realize that in the long run the situation is really not to their benefit. Today we see a militant India pursuing the policy of evicting its Muslim population from some of its eastern parts. But if India's military might is augmented to such an extent that it becomes still more formidable, it has to be utilized. But even if not utilized in action, by its very presence, certain things can be made to take place. An aggressive country does not have to resort to an armed attack. In fact, an armed conflict need not take place at all. It is not necessary that a physical attack should be launched against Pakistan, that guns should be turned against us. The imbalance of power, the disparity of strength between the two countries, would be so great that normally it could demoralize the weaker one. Of course the Pakistani nation is not easily demoralized. Nonetheless, in objective terms, disparity is undesirable, and I use the word disparity advisedly, because we know what can be achieved through it without the use of force. An aggressive superior Power does not have to use force. For instance, if a nuclear Power has any objectives to achieve against a non-nuclear Power, it does not have to use force. A situation may arise when India may seek to achieve its objectives, not by the use of force, but by the demonstration of force. And force has always been deployed by India against Pakistan. By demonstrating its formidable military might, India could pursue policies, which are not reconcilable with peace or with good relationship with Pakistan. If today we face a situation in which there is mass exodus of Muslims from India, we cannot be oblivious of these facts. We have to reckon with that situation, for we have a moral obligation to those people. That situation in its totality further tends to aggravate the problem between us and India.

We have heard our friends opposite say: "Why do you not take the question of the eviction of Indian Muslims to the United Nations ?" We would have done so without a second thought if that were the answer to the question. We have studied the United Nations Charter and we know its limitations. The United Nations is not a superstate nor a supreme court. It does not issue edicts or writs, which are necessarily complied with. The Charter has its limitations and we know the pitfalls in taking such problems to the United Nations. In the final analysis, these problems have to be faced and overcome by us, the people of Pakistan. And what does that mean? If the two problems of Kashmir and the eviction of Indian Muslims remain unsolved and, at the same time through Western military assistance, India gets mightier day by day, so that there is no question of a balance of power between the two countries, that means a grim and bleak future for us. In that situation we must take a fresh look at our responsibilities.

VIII

The Commonwealth Conference — R.C.D. — Muslim Evictees — Ceylon, Burma and Nepal — Kashmir — Relations with the United States — Cyprus Question — Relations with China — No Basic Change in Policy (21st August 1964)

The Leader of the Opposition and his colleagues, who have spoken this morning, while basically not disagreeing with the Government's foreign policy, have, nevertheless, attacked it and have, as I shall show, made some statements which are without validity. They have also enquired what the rationale of our foreign policy was. They want to know how exactly we stand with regard to certain great Powers. They have asked for a precise definition of our relations with the United States and a similar definition of our relations with the People's Republic of China. They said that in the past, i.e., before this Government took over, they were clear about Pakistan's relations with those and various other countries, but that at present they were not clear about them. Let me explain the situation. Before this Government came into power, irrespective of Pakistan's fundamental and vital interests, the country was wholly committed as a satellite of a particular Power. This position was fully known. No matter what Pakistan's interests were and no matter how they were injured, the previous Governments had to toe the line laid down by that Power, and, as its stooge, even behave in a manner hostile to certain other countries. That was the position until 1958. The present Government of Pakistan follows a foreign policy, which is based only on considerations of the country's vital interests, such as its inherent needs of security and the welfare of its people, and on no other consideration. It is a policy which takes into account our paramount national interests, for whose defence the people of Pakistan, we know, will be ever ready to rally round the present Government and endure any hardships and make any sacrifices that are asked of them. We have developed normal and friendly relations with our neighbours, because that too is in Pakistan's interest. Under the servile and senile policy, which was followed by the former regimes, no matter how Pakistan's interests were affected, they did not have the courage to deviate

from their behaviour as a stooge and a satellite. In contrast with that, the present Government does not hesitate to disagree even with the great Powers who are its allies, whenever Pakistan's interests so demand. Ours is a policy of self-respect and self-assertion. It is because of this fact that Pakistan's prestige has gone up in the world and particularly in Asia and Africa.

There was some reference to the Communique of the Commonwealth Conference. The Hon'ble the Leader of the Opposition said that we had made much of this Communique. I should like to present to the House the facts about it. It is not we who have made much of the Communique. On the contrary, it is India that has done so. India has been up in arms against the reference in the Communique to Indo-Pakistan disputes. In this context, I shall quote to the House the statement made by the Indian Information Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, who was a member of the Indian Delegation to the Commonwealth Conference, just before she left London for her country. Question: "The papers have been carrying reports in the last few days that there is a strong movement in India now for getting out of the Commonwealth. We have known it; it was there all along. Presumably, your father in a sense kept India in. Do you think over ten or twenty years India will stay in or not?" Answer: "Well, it is very difficult to prophesy anything. There has been this movement since the beginning but this time there has been great resentment, if I may use that word, because of the mention of Kashmir (in the Communique). It has been a convention that no internal problems should be discussed (in the Conference), because (if they are) then you get involved in an impasse. And our Finance Minister, who was the Leader of our Delegation, Mr. Krishnamachari, foresaw this and really warned the Conference about it." Question: "Do you think the very fact that it was mentioned in the Communique may cause that kind of resentment and that would lead to India leaving the Commonwealth on that issue?" Answer: "Well, as you yourself have mentioned there is that resentment. I am not in India, so I only know what our papers have mentioned."

Now this statement was not made by or on behalf of the Pakistan Delegation. It was made by the Information Minister of India, who was a member of the Indian Delegation. In India itself, there was an uproar in the Congress Party and in the newspapers, which reflected the resentment in India on account of the reference in the Communique to Kashmir. We are not taking any credit for it, but the fact of the matter is that for the first time in seventeen years there has been anything like this reference. It was not a miracle, as the Leader of the Opposition has said, but, nonetheless, there must have been some cogent reasons for it. The House will recall that in 1951, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan refused to go to London to attend the Commonwealth Conference until he was given an assurance that there would be some discussion on Kashmir, even though it be out-* side the Conference and informally. At that time, the mere fact that the Prime Minister of Pakistan was able to obtain such an assurance was regarded as a great triumph. In the present case, there was a reference to Kashmir in the Conference and a discussion about it in which seventeen out of eighteen countries participated, all supporting Pakistan. That I think is a matter, which is noteworthy. I hope that the members of the Opposition, even if they themselves are not willing to recognize its significance, will, at least, allow the people of Pakistan to do so.

In respect of the Istanbul accord, I have already made it clear that this is an agreement for economic, social and cultural co-operation and that nobody should unnecessarily read more into it. It is not necessary to take an agreement such as this, which is not a treaty to the Parliaments of the contracting countries. This has not been done in Iran, or in Turkey, or in Pakistan. If it were a treaty, then the constitutions of the countries concerned would require it to be referred to their respective Parliaments. But this is an agreement, an economic social and cultural agreement. As a matter of fact, we have in the past signed many economic agreements with other countries.

There is also an aspect of this matter which is of basic importance. The three countries that are parties to this agreement have, since 1955, been linked through a Pact together with certain other countries, which are not geographically or culturally connected with them. The new agreement, however, provides for co-operation in the economic, social and cultural fields in a meaningful and constructive way, outside the ambit of that Pact. In this respect the agreement represents a significant development. Let us assume that such an agreement had existed before the Baghdad Pact came into being and that it was confined to Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq. Then subsequently, even if the policy of Iraq had required it to leave the Baghdad Pact, that country would not necessarily have left the Regional Co-operation Agreement. In that case, our relations with Iraq would have remained warm and cordial, as indeed they are today, but our mutual collaboration would have been much greater. From that point of view also R.C.D. is important. Furthermore, we wish to see other countries of the region to co-operate with us in the economic, social and cultural spheres. Indeed, regional co-operation is possible between all the countries of our neighbourhood and ourselves. We have the advantage that while West Pakistan is adjacent to the Middle East, East Pakistan has geographical proximity with the countries of South East Asia. These countries, too, could participate in this or a similar scheme of co-operation. Thus wherever people are poor and need development, they could pool their resources for the common good of all and through collective effort, obtain among other benefits, the benefits of modern technology. I think R.C.D. has great potentialities. Under it the 150 million people of Iran, Turkey and Pakistan will join hands and in due course other countries could also come in. All that we are anxious about today is to wipe out the stigma of poverty and to better the lives of our people and for that purpose to see that our resources are utilized to the best advantage. I am confident that the R.C.D. idea will evoke a sympathetic response in other countries as well.

We have been asked what the Arab reaction to this arrangement will be. What will be the reaction of China to it? Generally speaking, as far as the

Arab world is concerned, its reaction so far has not been unfavourable. Some members of the House have referred to what are really cheap pamphlets published in certain countries. We cannot regard these as representative of responsible opinion, and nor is it fair to give a single quotation from one newspaper as an indication of the general attitude of the Arab world. You could, in any part of the world, pick up a newspaper which criticises every development. Let us not be misled by irresponsible journalistic reports. By and large, the Arab world has not reacted unfavourably to R.C.D. and we hope the Arabs will not take an adverse view of it, for there is nothing in it which is likely to prove injurious to them. On the other hand, if they give it proper and sympathetic consideration, they will find that they too may gain from this arrangement.

As far as the People's Republic of China is concerned, there has been a positive response on its part. It has welcomed this effort at regional co-operation and regards it an important landmark in Afro-Asian solidarity. This has been stated by the President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China. Now, if the whole world had approved of this regional arrangement, and there are in it germs of development for greater prosperity for the people of the countries that have joined it, I fail to understand why the Leader of the Opposition and his followers should be so cynical about it. It is understandable that because it is an accomplishment of the present regime, they must criticise it. But I do not think that they ought to carry their hatred of this regime to such an extent as to find fault even with beneficent things done by it, and thereby spread that hatred not only amongst the people of Pakistan but also those of other countries. The arrangement we have been talking about is an epochal achievement. The President of Pakistan played a magnificent role in bringing it about and he deserved the hero's welcome which he received on his return home.

The Hon'ble the Leader of the Opposition has been critical about our policy with regard to Kashmir. We are told that it is useless to negotiate with the

Government of India. You will remember that when we had six rounds of negotiations with that Government there was, in this House, a hue and cry against them and the Government was condemned by Opposition members for entering into them. They themselves admit that there are only two ways of solving the problem of Kashmir, i.e., either by war or by negotiation. The Leader of the Opposition recognizes that the cease-fire which came into effect in 1949 precludes the possibility of solving it by war. In any event, as a wise man and father of many children, he is conscious of the devastation a war can bring, and of the destruction of life and property that it can cause. He, therefore, discards war as a method of settling disputes and concedes that negotiation is the only way of settling them. But when we enter into negotiations, with equal force and eloquence, he deprecates our doing so. The only explanation of this attitude is that the Opposition must criticise and find fault with everything which the Government does. But from the practical point of view this attitude is wholly unhelpful. Furthermore, he enters a caveat with regard to negotiations. He says we must negotiate, but only on our own terms. Negotiations in themselves imply a spirit of give and take, moderation, conciliation and accommodation. He says, on the one hand, we should under no circumstances be moderate, conciliatory or accommodating; on the other hand he says that the Government of Pakistan should negotiate.

Actually, our basic difficulty with the leaders of the Government of India is also of a like nature. One of the reasons why India has not been able to settle its problems either with Pakistan or with any other of its neighbours is that the Government of India does not possess the spirit required for negotiation. Past experience has shown that India does not believe in the principle of give and take on a reasonable and honourable basis. That is why it has problems with Pakistan and problems with its other neighbours. Only recently, we hear, the High Commissioner of India in Ceylon addressed a gathering of Tamils and told them that the time would soon come when the Tamil language would have what he called its due place in Ceylon. That naturally caused consternation in that country. India seeks interference in

the affairs of other countries and even seeks to impose its will on them. That has caused problems not only for us but for our neighbours as well. I should like to mention one particular problem. In so far as the eviction of Indian Muslims to Pakistan is concerned, India maintains that as a sovereign state it has the right to evict its Muslim citizens. It claims the right to unilaterally and arbitrarily declare that these Indian Muslims are not Indian citizens, but that they are Pakistan infiltrators. On this pretext they are thrown out from India into Pakistan. This is India's position as far as Indian Muslims are concerned. In the case of Ceylon, millions of Tamils, Indian citizens have gone into that small island. India demands of the Government of Ceylon under no circumstances to treat them as Indian citizens. According to the Government of India, the Government of Ceylon, has no right, whatsoever, to say that these persons from India, who have been infiltrating into Ceylon for years, are infiltrators, and that all that the Government of Ceylon may do is to declare them stateless citizens. Now, when the Government of Ceylon asks the Government of India to negotiate the question of their status, the Government of India refuses to do so. When we ask the Government of India to negotiate a settlement of the problem of Muslim evictees from India— and their nationality and origin are ascertainable—the Government of India refuses to negotiate. When we say that there should be an international commission or some other body to help decide this matter, India refuses to agree and says it has the sovereign right to throw out these people from India on the basis of its own determination as to whether they are Indians or Pakistanis. When Ceylon asks India to negotiate, or to agree to the setting up of a conciliatory commission or some other machinery for the determination of the status of the Indians who have infiltrated into Ceylon, India declines and declares that the Government of Ceylon has no right to treat those people as Indian citizens. It is the application of these inconsistent standards which is responsible for the difficulties between India and its neighbours. We sympathise with the legitimate grievances of the Government and people of Ceylon. We must not forget that Ceylon is an important and friendly neighbour of ours.

So far as the evictions are concerned, we have offered to negotiate with India. We have proposed other means of settlement, such some kind of machinery for conciliation. India has refused to agree to anything. These unfortunate Indian Muslims are being thrown into East Pakistan, which is a most densely populated area and already over-crowded. We just cannot afford to take these people in. The evictions are a form of economic aggression against Pakistan. Our patience is being worn out, and a time might come, unfortunate though it will be, when the situation deteriorates to such an extent that we are compelled in the interest of our own survival to act on the principle of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.

I shall now pass on to refer to the after-effects of the nationalisation laws adopted in Burma. As a consequence of those laws, we have had to make certain adjustments in our relations with Burma in the interest of our own people in that country. But this was done in a spirit of understanding and co-operation with the Government of Burma. India, however, showed no such spirit. It violated the new nationalisation laws of Burma and converted its Embassy in Rangoon into a bank, a depository of the wealth of its citizens in Burma. The result was that relations between Burma and India worsened. We, in Pakistan, agreed to a solution of the Nef river problem with Burma in a spirit of give and take. In a identical situation, India has refused to do so, and its Nef boundary with Burma remains unsettled.

Relations between Nepal and India may now be improving. We certainly hope that they would improve. In the past, however, relations between these two countries were bad and India took every opportunity to interfere in the internal affairs of Nepal. Thus in trying to understand India's attitude towards Pakistan, it is necessary to appreciate the mentality and approach of India, not only towards Pakistan, but also towards its other neighbours. Pakistan is the most important of India's neighbours, if only because India regards Pakistan as its Enemy Number One.

This brings me back to the question of Kashmir. That question has to be looked at in the context of the overall position to which I have referred. There have been certain important developments in regard to Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah has been released from jail. We have been told not to claim any credit for it. We have not claimed any credit for it, but the fact of the matter is that our efforts in the United Nations did help in some ways. We did not entirely precipitate the events that led to the release of Sheikh Abdullah though his release was, at least to some extent connected with our taking the case once again to the Security Council. But we are not trying to seek any credit for it. However, Sheikh Abdullah's release has, undoubtedly, given a new aspect to the Kashmir situation. We have been watching with great interest and with deep concern all that is happening in Kashmir. The Indian Government has suggested that our President should meet Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri to negotiate a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. We are always ready and willing to negotiate with India our outstanding differences, but for negotiations to be productive of results, it is necessary that there should be a change of the heart in India and some evidence of India's willingness to settle the Kashmir dispute. A meeting at the Summit always arouses a considerable degree of hope and expectancy. People expect something concrete to emerge from a Summit Conference. It was for this reason that in 1962, when it was suggested that there should be a Summit Conference between Prime Minister Nehru and President Ayub, we took the stand that it would be preferable to have first a meeting at a lower level in order to clarify the issues and define the ground rules. That is why negotiations on a Ministerial level were in the first instance undertaken. We still abide by that approach. A Summit Conference should take place only when there is some indication of progress, if not of a complete settlement.

Thus we feel that it would be preferable to have a meeting of Ministers again to prepare the ground for a Summit Meeting. But that should come if there is a sincere desire on the part of India to reach a settlement with Pakistan. Are

there any indications of that? One fails to see any. If there had been such a desire, India would not have resented an innocuous reference to Indo-Pakistan disputes in the Communique of the Commonwealth Conference. There are no indications except the speeches that have recently been made. But speeches have also been made in the past.

The economic situation in India is deteriorating rapidly. We are concerned about it because it involves the fate of people who have shared with us a common past. Poverty in itself is a terrible thing e But now we hear of hunger stalking India, and of starvation and food riots in that country. This situation is most deplorable, and we would be happy to see a speedy end to it.

India has a large population to feed. She has more than 400 million people. We fail to understand why, when its own population is starving India should take on the added burden of the four million people of Jammu and Kashmir. It should release these people from its colonial rule, so that they can associate themselves with Pakistan and get a release also from the misery of want and hunger. If India did that it would be relieved of a great liability. In any event, the destiny of those people is linked with that of Pakistan.

Unfortunately, colonial powers are always reluctant to liquidate their colonies. This is shown by the history of colonialism all over the world. Only recently when I made a comparison between India and Portugal, based upon an objective analysis of their respective positions, the Indian Press indulged in all manner of slander against me. Well! They may continue to do that. They may continue to attack me until the cows come home. But there are certain facts that are undeniable. We know that the British have liquidated most of their colonies; the French have done the same; the Dutch have done the same; the Belgians have done the same. Only Portugal and India retain colonies. Portugal retains Mozambique and Angola; India retains Jammu and Kashmir. One of the reasons why India and Portugal are on bad terms is that

they are competing, each to retain its colonial domination. And this is no criticism of India. On the contrary, it is only a statement of facts.

We hope that the international situation and the basic interests of India will compel its Government to come to a settlement with Pakistan. On our part, we will continue to strive for an honourable and equitable solution of the Kashmir question. Let me tell this House that we shall never tire in our efforts to secure for the people of Jammu and Kashmir their right of self-determination. This is our national duty and a national obligation which Pakistan has to fulfil. Reference has been made by some members to our relations with the United States and with China. As we have often said, we do not like the deterioration that has taken place in our relations with the United States; but it is not something of our doing. We have many interests in common with the United States. That country has contributed greatly to the economic progress of our people. Whatever our failings and faults, we are not an ungrateful people. We are mindful of what Americans have done for us. We, on our part, have never wavered in fulfilling our obligations to them. But, unfortunately, there has come about a freakish situation which has caused some strain in our relations with the United States. It has been imposed upon us. As I said at the very outset, nothing is more important to us than the preservation of the interests of Pakistan and its people. We shall continue to regard that as our primary obligation. We hope that the Government and the people of the United States will appreciate the difficulties confronting our country.

We have been given assurances by the United States that in the event of aggression against Pakistan, the United States will come to Pakistan's assistance. However, in practical terms, this assurance, which I have no doubt has been given with good intentions, is one of doubtful value. As I said in a previous session of this House, it is very difficult to determine who is the aggressor and who is the victim. especially in modern warfare. By the time

the question is debated and determined, the carnage will have taken place and all the damage will have been done.

Will the United States be in a position to make the assumption that India is the aggressor and Pakistan the victim? Furthermore, what kind of assistance will the United States be prepared to give us? Will it be withdrawal of economic and military aid to India; or will it be economic sanctions or some other action in the United Nations? Or is it to be a NATO type of assurance that aggression against Pakistan will be treated as aggression against the United States? In addition, will the United States be willing to guarantee not only Pakistan's own frontiers but also those of Azad Kashmir? As far as we are concerned, the destiny of Kashmir is linked with our's and, therefore, it is imperative that Azad Kashmir should also come within the scope of that assurance. These and other considerations have to be taken into account. It is not that that we do not want to overcome the present difficulties but the situation is grave as well as complex and we cannot accept any illusory assurances. We cannot lull our people into a false sense of security. To do this would be to practise deception on them. It would be much better to squarely face the crisis in our relations with a powerful and mighty ally than to deceive our people into believing that the assurance given to us is enough to safeguard our national sovereignty and other interests.

We have seen in the case of Cyprus, as the Leader of the Opposition has pointed out, that military assistance provided by the United States to Greece and Turkey was used by both those countries against each other. This is a most recent example which demonstrates that, from a practical point of view, such assurances cannot really be meaningful.

With regard to the Cyprus question itself, we are happy to note that there has been some helpful development and we hope and pray that a satisfactory solution of it will soon emerge. We are, however, surprised at India's attitude in the matter of Cyprus. In the past, India used to preach and even seek to

dictate what was good for the world. But of recent years, India has been rather shy and reticent. We have seen that on the question of Viet Nam, although occupying an important position as Co-Chairman of the International Control Commission, India has been altogether silent. In the case of Cyprus, however, the Government of India promptly came forward to offer sympathy and support to the Government of Makarios, thus confirming the common aim of the two governments. The Government of India is engaged in the liquidation of the Muslim minority in its territory; the Government of Makarios is engaged in the liquidation of the Turkish Muslim minority in Cyprus.

In respect of our relations with the People's Republic of China, some members of the Opposition have said that circumstances have so conspired that those relations have improved. Let us give the credit for that improvement to circumstances. Obviously, circumstances must have the effect either of leading to success or failure. In the past when they were in power, circumstances were against them and they failed. Now circumstances have helped us and we have succeeded. However, our relations with China are not of a negative character. They are not based only on the fact that China has a dispute with India and we have a dispute with India. That is not the basis of Pakistan-China relations. They are based on positive factors. China is a close neighbour of Pakistan, with a common boundary of almost four hundred miles. As a small country, we believe that the United Nations cannot be strengthened without the presence of China in it. You cannot hope for the rule of international law with seven hundred million people debarred from participation in the United Nations. That is why we have supported the admission of People's Republic of China into the United Nations. It was wrong of the Hon'ble the Leader of the Opposition to say that we did that only last year. As you will recall, Sir, in the year previous to the last year, you yourself, as a member of our Delegation to the General Assembly, cast a ballot in favour of the admission of People's China. We believe that China should be admitted to the United Nations, because without it international

law cannot really be reinforced. We also believe that without China's participation in the United Nations, you cannot bring about a permanent and lasting settlement of disputes in South East Asia. We believe too that you cannot have meaningful and constructive disarmament that is general and complete disarmament, which is the cherished goal of all, so long as the People's Republic of China, representing seven hundred million, is absent from the United Nations. We are a part and China is an important part of Asia and Africa. We shall collaborate with China and with all other peace-loving countries for the promotion of the solidarity and welfare of the people of Africa and Asia, and for the liquidation in these countries of the forces of colonialism and its ramparts still maintained by Portugal and India. We shall collaborate with all those countries which believe in the salvation of the people of Asia and Africa, and China is a most important one of them.

Nothing will give us greater satisfaction than to see the eventual, I would not call it a settlement, but a recognition, of the realities of the situation as between the United States and China. A breakthrough in the difficult, though somewhat artificial situation, between those two great Powers is urgently called for. If it could come, that would be the most important single factor conducive to international peace and security. In the realisation of this objective, Pakistan will be ready to play whatever modest role it can. We are not saying this a spirit of presumption. We know that world conditions require that at a certain stage there must be some relaxation in the tension between the United States and China. The present situation cannot last for long. Because of the impasse between them, the people of the United States and the people of China are the losers and, indeed, the people of the whole world. The forces of history and the compulsion of events are bound to move irresistibly. It is wrong to say that a detente or good relations between the Soviet Union and the United States are in the interest of world peace and at the same time to maintain that the isolation of China is in the interest of world peace. These double standards are obnoxious and cannot be applied to diplomacy in this second half of the twentieth century. We hope that slowly

the force of reason and the processes of negotiation and accommodation will bring themselves to bear upon and lead to an improvement in China-United States relations. I repeat, we will be willing to undertake whatever limited role we can play in this matter.

Before I conclude, I wish to state that the present foreign policy of Pakistan is predicated and based on only one consideration, and that is the security and the well-being of the people of Pakistan. There are no other considerations. We are not willing to sacrifice the basic interests of Pakistan, no matter what advantages—illusory, false superficial advantages—which any other considerations might bring. We are not boasting that our foreign policy is independent, because we do not like the application to it of clichés and labels. All that we would say is that without making any alteration in the basic structure of the foreign policy of the country, we are pursuing it with self-respect. On the same basis in the past, they pursued a foreign policy of subservience which deprived Pakistan of all prestige. In order that there should be; some independence in our policy, there are those who want us to leave the Pacts. They should know that we have achieved that independence without making the change which they advocate. To those who are opposed to a basic change, and at the same time do not mind subservience or dependence we say that there will be no such change, and. while our policy will be conducted under an umbrella, it will be without loss of dignity or independence. To those who tell us that we can follow an independent foreign policy only by making a change in our alignments, we say that in the dynamics of the twentieth century, we can pursue an independent policy without making such a change. The present Government has served the interests of Pakistan with courage and fortitude, but without altering the basis of the country's foreign policy. But if a basic change becomes necessary in the interest of the country, that change will be made.